摘要
在理论推导三者关系的基础之上，以2005～2008年中国制造业26个行业上市公司和行业数据为样本，实证分析地方政府干预对产能过剩影响过程中企业过度投资的中介作用。研究发现，地方政府不当干预可以引发企业过度投资，进而造成产能过剩问题；地方政府不当干预造成的企业内部成本外部化、国有企业低成本扩张等都是造成我国体制性产能过剩的主要原因。抑制产能过剩，要抓住其主要矛盾和根源，进行顶层设计和系统谋划。
Based on the theoretical derivation of the relationship of the three variables, taking China＇s manufacturing listed companies in 26 industries and industry data between 2005 and 2008 as sample, this theses empirically analyzes the mediating effect of enterprises overinvestment in the process of the effect of local government intervention on over capacity. We find that improper intervention of local governments may cause enterprises overinvestment, and then trigger the issue of over capacity. Internal costs externalization and state-owned enterprises expanding at a low cost caused by improper intervention of local government are all the main reasons of institutional over capacity of our country. We should seize the main problems to control the over capacity by making the top- level design and system planning.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第12期52-62,共11页
Reform
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目"抑制产能过剩与治理重复建设对策研究"(批准号:09&ZD026)
关键词
地方政府干预
企业过度投资
产能过剩
产业经济
local government intervention, enterprise overinvestment, over capacity, industry economy
