摘要
地方政府的行为不仅受到经济激励和政治激励的影响,同时也面临着来自行政体系设计和治理对象主体行动的风险约束。本文通过对武陵市"整村推进"贫困治理过程中,地方扶贫部门借助"申诉"行为,寻求决策高层变革治理目标,进而软化风险环境的个案描述与分析,提出风险约束下地方政府行为的理论解释框架。文章认为,在日益凸显的行政风险约束环境下,地方政府发展出"变通"、"共谋"和"申诉"等多重应对策略。这种应对策略的差异性,可以经由治理情境这一中观分析单元来解释。
The behavior of local government is not only shaped by economic and political incentives,but also confronted with risk constraint from the design of the administrative system and the action of the administrational objects.During poverty reduction process in Wuling city's 'entire-village advancement' program,in order to reduce governance risk,local poverty alleviation office seeks to persuade high-level decision-makers to change the original governance objective by means of 'appeal'. With the description and analysis of this case,the paper proposes a theoretical framework to explain local governmental behavior in risk constraint.The author argues that local governments have explored multiple strategies of ' being flexible', ' collusion' and ' appeal' under the environment of increasing administrative risk constraint,and the middle-level analysis of governance situations is conducive to explain the adoption of different coping strategies by local governments.
出处
《社会学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期98-124,244,共27页
Sociological Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目"过疏化对于新阶段扶贫开发工作的挑战与应对"(批准号:11YJC840035)
中国博士后科学基金面上资助"整村推进政策在特殊类型贫困地区实践绩效评估及其政策建议--基于恩施与凉山的实证研究"(批准号:20100480918)的阶段性成果
