摘要
运用双寡头的序贯博弈证明:在位企业在使用产能过剩策略阻碍潜在厂商进入市场时,并不一定会导致行业的产能过剩。产品关系、厂商的技术优势以及价格需求弹性对遏制作用有决定性影响。在策略替代条件下,该策略不会形成行业的产能过剩。而且,当在位企业拥有绝对技术优势时,并不需要采用阻碍策略,当技术优势不明显时,在位厂商可以选择合适的产量有效地阻碍潜在厂商进入;在策略互补条件下,在位企业也可以有效地阻止潜在厂商进入,但会引起行业的产能过剩。
Based on a duopoly sequential-move game,the paper draws a valuable conclusion： as incumbent firms are to impede potential rivals with the excess capacity strategy,it does not necessarily lead to overcapacity,and product attribution,technical superiority and demand elasticity have decisive effects to its function.Under strategic substitution competitive environments,it can not cause excessive capacity,and with absolute technical superiority established firm will not use it to deter prospective entrants,otherwise,the established firm can successfully deter prospective entrants with proper amount of product;under strategic complement competitive environments,it will lead to excessive capacity and can successfully used to deter prospective entrants by incumbent firms.
出处
《计算机与数字工程》
2013年第3期342-345,共4页
Computer & Digital Engineering
基金
2011年度渤海大学高等教育教学改革研究项目(编号:92)
2012年度渤海大学大学生科技创新项目(编号:bdskyb201219)
2012年锦州市社会科学重点研究课题
2012年渤海大学开放实验项目资助
关键词
博弈论
产能过剩
竞争性策略
策略替代
策略互补
game theory
excess capacity
competitive strategy
strategic substitution
strategic complement
