官员晋升激励与政府绩效目标设置——中国省级面板数据的实证研究被引量：159

Promotion Incentive of Government Officials and Government Performance Target-setting: An Empirical Analysis of Provincial Panel Data in China

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摘要本文旨在实证分析官员的晋升激励对政府绩效目标设置水平的影响,着重考察官员任期和来源的直接作用及二者的交互效应。以省长(市长、自治区主席)为研究对象,采用中国31个省份的面板数据(1999—2011),本文系统收集了各省政府工作报告中的预期经济增长率数据并将其作为绩效目标设置水平。研究显示,政府官员的任期和来源都会影响其设置的预期经济增长目标。官员任期与政府绩效目标设置水平呈U型曲线关系,本地升迁的政府官员往往会设置较高水平的经济增长目标,而中央调任和外地平调的政府官员在目标设置方面没有显著差异。本文还发现,官员来源对任期同政府绩效目标设置产生调节效应,说明不同来源的政府官员在不同任期会设定不同的政府绩效目标水平。作为最早考察这一问题的研究之一,本文深化了人们对政府绩效目标设置逻辑的认识,也为干部人事管理制度改革提供了理论启示。 The objective of this paper is to empirically examine the effect of cadre promotion incentive on government performance target-setting,and particularly to investigate the independent and joint effects of tenure in office and career background.Using panel data from provincial governments and provincial governors(mayors or presidents)in China(1999-2011),the paper collects data on expected economic growth rate as government performance targets.The results show that officials' tenure in office and career background significantly affect their economic growth expectation.Tenure in office has a U-shaped nonlinear relationship with expected economic growth rate,and local promoted officials are apt to set higher performance targets whereas central and interprovincial transferred officials have insignificant effects.We also find career background moderates the relationship between officials' tenure in office and government performance target-setting,further complicating their mechanisms.As one of the first empirical analysis of performance target-setting in local China,our findings deepen the understanding of the interesting phenomena and also generate implications for cadre personnel management reform.

作者马亮

机构地区南洋理工大学南洋公共管理研究生院西北工业大学人文与经法学院

出处《公共管理学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第2期28-40,138,共13页 Journal of Public Management

关键词政府绩效目标设置晋升激励职业顾虑政府工作报告 Government Performance,Target-setting,Promotion Incentive,Career Concern,Government Work Report

分类号 D035 [政治法律—政治学]

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