摘要
本文以贝叶斯决策理论为基础,构建了一个制度体系模型来模拟威权体制的决策过程,并通过求解均衡条件方法分析威权体制内"下属揣摩逢迎领导意图现象"的原因、危害及应对措施。分析结果表明,对上负责的制度设计是导致"下属揣摩逢迎领导意图现象"的根本原因;"下属揣摩逢迎领导意图现象"会造成两种类型的领导决策偏误,即"Ⅰ型决策偏误"和"Ⅱ型决策偏误"。进一步的研究表明,单向透明的信息传递机制和领导自身的"勤政"努力对于缓解因"揣摩逢迎偏误"而引发的"决策偏误"都有正向作用。但是,如果要从根本上解决因"揣摩逢迎偏误"而引发的"决策偏误",则需要改变威权体制内下属业绩评价及职业命运由领导主观决定的制度安排,并引入客观的评价标准。
In this article, Bayesian decision theory is applied to build a system model to simulate the decision-making process of the authoritarian regime, and therefore to figure out the cause, disadvantage, and countermeasures of the ＂flattering phenomenon＂ within the authoritarian regime. The results show that： the design of the upward responsible system is the root causes of the ＂flattering phenomenon＂. The ＂flattering phenomenon＂ will lead to two types of decision-making biases. Under the premise that the macro institutional environment runs well, namely： the returns of the superiors are positively related to the correct rates of their decisions, as well as the correct rates of the superiors＇ decisions are posi- tively related to the accuracy rates of the information to make the decisions, if the performance appraisals and the career destinies of the subordinates are all decided by their superiors, the subordinates will try to flatter their superiors in order to satisfy the ideas of the superiors to maximize the returns that depended on the decisions of superiors, and therefore the information supported by the subordinates will include ＂flattering bias＂. The information reported by the subordinates containing ＂flattering bias＂ will lead to two types of decision-making biases, which are ＂Type-I decision making bias＂ for ＂muddle-type＂ superiors and ＂Type-II decision making bias＂ for ＂smart-type＂ superiors. If the above-mentioned macro institutional environment cannot run well, namely： the returns of the superiors are not positively related to the correct rates of their decisions, the superiors themselves will also try to flatter their own superiors, and the system will even induce decision disasters. Further studies show that one-way transparent information delivery mechanisms and leadership ＂diligent＂ efforts will alleviate decision-making biases. However, to fundamentally solve the decision-making biases resulting from flattering needs to change the system design that the performance evaluation and career fate of subordinates are all decided by superiors, and to introduce objective evaluation criteria.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期24-31,67,共9页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71173225)资助
关键词
威权体制
揣摩逢迎
决策偏误
Authoritarian Regime
Flattering
Decision-making Bias
