摘要
文章为解决闭环供应链在不同市场需求时的定价策略及效率优化问题,利用博弈理论,在单周期情况下构建了非线性市场需求下的闭环供应链的数学模型。在此基础上研究了非对称信息下闭环供应链上各成员瞒报成本时的定价策略和其对各自利润的影响。研究结果表明:当制造商瞒报其生产成本时,并不能使自己的利润提高,此时零售商和闭环供应链整体的利润也不变;当零售商瞒报其成本时,会提升自己的利润,同时会使制造商的利润降低,此时系统整体的利润变化则有赖于系统参数的关系。在以后的多周期的市场行为中,相对于制造商,零售商更有瞒报成本的内在动力。
Aiming at the problem of pricing strategy and efficiency optimization of closed-loop supply chain,the article used the game theory as the basic method,built a model of closed-loop supply chain of nonlinear demand in single-cycle,and researched the pricing strategy and the influence to its owner profit when the members of the closed-loop supply chain Which lied about their real cost in the sense of asymmetric information on those ground.The research results indicate that when manufactures lied about their real cost,they can＇t promote their profit,their profit and retailers＇ profit keep fixed;but when retailers do this,they can promote their own profit and reduce manufactures＇ profit,at the moment,the whole chain＇s profit depends on the relation of system parameter.So,contrast manufacturers and the retailers have more inner power to lie about their real cost when they act in the multi-cycle.
出处
《西安财经学院学报》
CSSCI
2013年第2期52-56,共5页
Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics
关键词
闭环供应链
博弈
非对称信息
非线性需求
closed-loop supply chain
game theory
asymmetric information
nonlinear demand
