税收征管、政企关系与上市公司债务融资被引量：114

Tax Collection and Management,the Government-enterprises Relationship and Corporate Debt Financing

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摘要本文以2003—2011年间沪深两市符合条件的上市公司为研究样本,通过双维度度量税收征管力度,研究了地区税收征管环境对中国上市公司债务融资能力的影响,并进而考察了政企关系对税收征管治理效应的影响。研究发现:①税收征管对公司的债务融资能力有显著的改善作用。由于税务机关具有核实债务人清偿能力和降低债权人求偿成本的作用,因此,在税收征管力度越强的地区,企业越容易获得债务融资,并且长期负债的比例更高,债务融资的成本也更低;②政企关系与税收征管在改善企业债务融资方面具有替代作用:与民营企业相比,税收征管对国有企业,尤其是央企债务融资能力的改善作用较弱;而对于有政治关系的民营企业,税收征管对其债务融资能力的改善作用也较其他民营企业更不明显。本文的研究不仅拓展了税收征管以及政企关系公司治理作用机制的研究领域,而且有助于纳税企业和税务机关全面认识税收征管工作的重要意义,从而为政府部门出台相关政策措施,最终实现政府职能的转变提供了现实依据。 This paper takes the sample of 2003-2011 qualified listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange to study the influence of tax collection and management on Chinese listed companies＇ debt financing capacity, and also investigated the influence of the government-enterprises relationship on the governance effect of tax collection and management by the double-dimensional measure of tax collection and management. We find that： ①Tax collection and management can improve companies＇ debt financing capacity significantly. Because the tax authorities can verify debtor＇s solvency and reduce the claim cost of creditor, so the stricter the tax management in a district is, the easier for the companies in that district to obtain debt financing. What＇s more, companies in that district can get long-term debt more easily and more cheaply. ②The roles of tax collection and management and the government-enterprises relationship are substitute in companies＇ debt financing capacity. Tax collection and management has a weaker effect on improving the debt financing capacity of state- owned enterprises, especially central enterprises, compared with private enterprises. Besides, for those private enterprises which have political relations, tax collection and management has a weaker effect on improving their debt financing capacity than other private enterprises. Our study not only expands the research field in the corporate governance mechanism of tax collection and management and government-enterprises relationship, but also can help the taxpaying enterprises and tax authorities to comprehensively understand the work of tax collection. So it can provide the realistic basis for government issuing relevant polices and final realization of transformation of government functions.

作者潘越王宇光戴亦一

机构地区厦门大学经济学院厦门大学管理学院

出处《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第8期109-121,共13页 China Industrial Economics

基金国家自然科学基金项目"非正式制度与公司财务行为研究"(批准号71072052) 国家自然科学基金项目"媒体的公司治理作用及其对资本市场的影响研究"(批准号71172051) 中央高校基本科研业务费项目"基于法律外制度视角的公司财务行为研究"(批准号2012221009)

关键词税收征管政企关系债务融资 tax collection and management the government-enterprises relationship debt financing

分类号 F276.7 [经济管理—企业管理]

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