摘要
本文以晋升博弈模型为基础,研究城市群内部核心城市之间的竞争与合作问题,提出了城市群内部"积极竞争,消极合作"的行为推论,并利用北京等8个城市的面板数据进行了实证检验。研究发现,在现有官员考核体制下,随着城市群内部竞争行为对本城市经济增长影响程度的提高,政府竞争趋于激烈;而随着城市群内部合作行为对其他城市经济增长影响程度的提高,政府合作更趋消极。因此,应当加强城市发展规划,提倡区域错位发展,同时改革现有考核体制,改变"唯GDP论",逐步将民生、生态等指标纳入其中。
This paper uses the model of political tournaments to specify the nature of competition and cooperation among cities in urban agglomeration. We make a inference that cities are likely to compete fiercely and cooperate inactively with other cities in the same urban agglomeration. We test our derivation using the panel data with 8 cities over 11 - year. We find that,in the condition of existing system of performance metering, when competition with other cities in the same urban agglomeration will promote economic growth, the governments are likely to compete fiercely with one another, but when cooperation with other cities in the same urban agglomeration will promote economic growth, the governments are likely to cooperate with one another inactively. Thus,we suggest that local government should pay much attention to the planning of development of cities and engage in dislocation development. Meanwhile, the system of performance metering should be reformed with enhancing the weight of livelihood and ecosystem into the indicator systems.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期79-88,共10页
Economic Review
基金
国家社科基金重大招标项目"未来十年深入实施西部大开发战略的关键和重点问题研究"(项目编号:10zd&024)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项"城市群内部竞争与地区经济增长研究--基于我国四大城市群面板数据的实证研究"(项目编号:JBK1307065)资金资助~~
关键词
积极竞争
消极合作
晋升博弈
推论验证
Positive Competition
Negative Cooperation
Political Tournaments
Inference Verification
