摘要
本文以我国上市公司2008-2011年的数据为样本,通过考察政府补助这一外生变量对高管超额薪酬以及薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响,检验高管薪酬契约的有效性。结果发现,经理人利用政府补助获得超额薪酬,谋取私利;并且经理人还通过提高薪酬-业绩敏感性,为其超额薪酬进行结果正当性辩护,以掩盖其自利的行为。上述研究显示,简单地将薪酬与业绩挂钩的契约会受到业绩噪音的影响,降低契约激励经理人努力的效应,这为我国进一步完善薪酬契约提供了新的经验证据。
Based on the data of 2008-2011 from the listed companies,the paper examines the compensation contract effectiveness to the executive by investigating the effect on executive overpay and pay-performance sensitivity caused by the government subsidies as an exogenous variable. We find that the executive takes benefit from government subsidies to reach overpay and seek personal interests. They also defend themselves by improvement of pay-performance sensitivity as an excuse of the excessive compensation to cover their self-interested behavior. Moreover,the study shows that simply linking compensation and performance will be affected by performance noise,which leads to reduce the incentive effect of the contract on the executive. This paper provides a new empirical evidence for us to improve the compensation contracts.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期42-48,95,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
已结项国家社科基金项目"我国垄断企业高管薪酬机制研究--薪酬管制的视角"(10XJL0012)的后续研究
国家自然科学基金项目(71372206
71302185)
西南财经大学中央高校团队"基于国际竞争力的中国企业成本管理创新"的资助
