摘要
交易信用作为一种短期融资模式,可以降低零售商的资金短缺对供应链运营的影响,但是由于市场需求的不确定性,提供交易信用的供应商会面临一定的信用风险。本文假设供应商是风险厌恶的,比较了无保险、全额保险和共同保险下供应商向零售商提供的最优交易信用数量、期望效用及保费。研究表明,有保险合同下供应商向零售商提供的交易信用数量会高于无保险时供应商向零售商提供的交易信用数量;并且随着保险公司赔付比例的增加,共同保险下供应商向零售商提供的交易信用数量会逐渐增加。此外,当供应商的风险厌恶程度很高时购买全额保险,否则购买共同保险,并且当风险厌恶程度越低时要求保险公司的赔付比例越低是供应商的最佳选择。
Capital constraints keep retailers from engaging in product purchasing from their suppliers,thereby reducing their suppliers＇ sales.Therefore,suppliers have the incentive to relieve their retailers from capital burden by providing trade credit.Trade credit,as s short-term financing mode,can be used to reduce the influence of retailers＇ capital shortage on the operation of supply chain.However,the suppliers who provide trade credit financing will probably hear some credit risks because of demand uncertainty.Trade credit insurance can transfer some credit risks to the insurance company and stimulate suppliers to provide trade credit financing.In this paper,we study the incentive eflect of trade credit insurance on financing from suppliers.We consider a risk-averse supplier that sells a product through a retailer which has no initial capital over a single selling season.The supplier has only one chance to produce the product before the selling season.The market demand during the selling season is uncertain.The supplier has to decide the trade credit amount before the selling season.After the demand is realized,the retailer sells the units that the supplier provids and pays for the units.If the market demand turns out to be high and the retailer＇ s selling revenue exceeds the promised payment,the supplier will receive his account receivable in full.On the other hand,if the market demand is low and the retailer＇ s selling revenue is insufficient to pay for the units in full,the supplier will force the retailer into bankruptcy to acquire the residual value of the retailer.We compare the risk-averse supplier＇ s optimal trade credit quantities,expected utilities and insurance premiums among non-insurance policy,full insurance policy and co-insurance policy.We assume there is a perectly competitive insurance market in which the insurer provides insurance at a fair price.It is shown that the optimal trade credit quantity that the supplier gives the retailer under insurance policy is larger than that without insurance policy.It is also shown that the optimal trade credit quantity that the supplier gives the retailer under co-insurance policy is increasing in the proportion to the premium covered by insurance company.The optimal trade credit quantity that the supplier gives the retailer under co-insurance policy is between the quantity that the supplier gives the retailer without insurance policy and the quantity that the supplier gives the retailer under full insurance policy.The optimal trade credit quantity that the supplier gives the retailer under full insurance policy is independent of the supplier＇ s risk-averse degree,while the optimal trade credit quantities that the supplier gives the retailer without insurance policy and under co-insurance policy are decreasing in the supplier＇ s risk-averse degree.Besides,it is the supplier＇ s optimal choice that when its risk-averse degree is high he buys a full insurance policy; otherwise,it buys a co-insurance policy and asks for a lower coverage proportion when its risk-averse degree is lower.Finally,the numerical study provides suggestions for suppliers of the supply chain to choose proper insurance policy in order to reduce its trade credit financing risks.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期160-165,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072063)
国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(71001063)
