摘要
股东与管理层的代理冲突是影响公司现金持有的关键因素,管理层权力的大小又体现了股东与管理层的代理冲突程度。本文运用2006-2010年我国上市公司数据,基于市场化进程的制度背景,实证检验了管理层权力与现金持有的关系。研究发现,管理层权力显著提高了上市公司的现金持有水平,但由管理层权力导致的高额持有现金产生了负面的价值效应,管理层权力对现金持有的影响与企业所在地区的市场化进程相关,市场化进程能够降低管理层权力与现金持有水平的正相关性,并进一步弱化管理层权力导致的高额持有现金的负面价值效应;进一步检验表明,权力强大的管理层所持有的高额现金恶化了公司过度投资,而市场化进程能够抑制管理层利用权力持有大量现金进行过度投资的行为。
As the firms＇ critical assets, the influences of cash holdings and its economic consequences has become the focus of academia both in domestic and abroad. Agency problem is the important factors that affect both the level of corporate cash holdings and its value. Management would pursuit personal interests through holding large amounts of cash. The greater the power, the stronger the ability to make decisions that can realize personal interests of management. The Chinese special system background of emerging and transition, and the low levels of governance make managerial power may over corporate governance mechanism; the agency conflict between managers and shareholders is bound to have great influence on the level and value of corporate cash holdings. However, how managerial power affects the level and value of corporate cash holdings？ Besides, through which channels management abuse of corporate cash？ For these questions, the existing literature is rarely involved. Moreover, the managerial power is closely associated with the governance environment. The improvement of the governance environment inevitably affects the management behavior with the advancement of the market reforms, and will affect the level of corporate cash holdings and its economic consequences. The existing research has not been involved in how the marketization process influence on the relationship be- tween corporate cash holdings and managerial power. Using the data from 2006 to 2010 of Chinese listed companies as samples, this paper empirically examines the relationship between managerial power and cash holdings based on the institutional background of marketization. This study finds that firms hold more cash when managerial power is stronger, however, the high cash accompanies by managerial power destroys firm value. The relationship between managerial power and cash holdings is influenced by the marketization process, specifi- cally, the marketization can reduce the positive correlation between managerial power and cash holdings, and further weaken the negative value effect of high cash holdings accompanies by managerial power. Further research finds that, the cash held by powerful managers exacerbates over-investment, but the marketization process can inhibit the over-investment behavior.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期34-45,共12页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71362004)
新疆维吾尔自治区普通高校人文社科重点研究基地项目(XJEDU020112A01)资助
