摘要
公司和黑客的风险偏好对信息安全技术组合配置策略有重要的影响.应用博弈论建立防火墙和入侵检测系统(IDS)的信息安全模型.结果表明:当公司的期望成本较低时,风险中立型公司更易被入侵;当公司的期望成本较高时,风险厌恶型公司更易被入侵.当黑客的期望收益较低时,风险厌恶型黑客被检测的概率最大;当黑客的期望收益较高时,风险追求型黑客被检测的概率最大.同时,定量研究了防火墙和IDS的防御和检测的经济效用,给出公司是否需要增配另一种信息安全技术,以及公司只能配置一种信息安全技术时的最优策略.
There is an important impact on configuration strategy of information security technologies based on risk preference of the firm and hacker. The security model including firewall and intrusion detection system （IDS） was established by game theory. The results show that for the risk-neutral firm, lower expected cost leads to higher probability of intrusion; for the risk-aversion firm, higher expected cost leads to higher probability of intrusion. For the risk-aversion hacker, lower expected benefit leads to higher probability of investigation; for the risk-seeking hacker, higher expected benefit leads to higher probability of investigation. Meanwhile, the protective and detective economics effects of firewall and IDS are respectively studied in quantify, and how to make an optimal strategy is derived if the firm deploys another information security technology, or if the firm only deploys one information security technology.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第3期324-333,共10页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071033)
江苏省2010年度研究生科研创新计划资助项目(CX10B_058Z)
