摘要
既有建筑绿色改造市场供需主体行为受到政府管制的影响,文章在考虑收益、风险、前期准备成本、政府激励约束政策等因素的基础上建立既有建筑业主和节能服务公司的演化博弈模型。研究结果表明:从不同初始情形出发,系统存在三种演化结果,业主和ESCO的最优稳定策略是主动进行绿色改造和提供高质量改造服务;政府激励约束政策、ESCO的前期准备成本、业主和ESCO的纯增量收益是影响博弈结果的关键因素;可通过提高纯增量收益和激励约束力度,降低增量风险和前期准备成本来优化演化博弈结果。最后,通过数值分析验证模型推理结论并提出优化方向。
The behavior of the supply and demand entities is affected by government regulation in the green retrofit market of existing buildings.This paper establishes an evolutionary game model among existing building owners and energy service companies considering the factors of revenue,risk,pre preparatory cost,incentive and constraint policy.The results indicate that there are three evolutionary results from different initial conditions,the best stable strategy for the owner and ESCO is to actively carry out green retrofit and provide high-quality retrofit services;the incentive and constraint policy of the government,the pre preparatory cost of ESCO,the pure incremental revenue of the owner and ESCO play a key role in the game results.We can optimize the results by improving pure incremental revenue,incentive and constraint,meanwhile by reducing incremental risk and pre preparatory cost.Finally,the paper demonstrates and optimizes the proposed model through numerical analysis.
作者
梁喜
付阳
LIANG Xi;FU Yang(College of Economics & Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2019年第1期65-72,107,共9页
Ecological Economy
关键词
绿色改造
政府管制
业主
ESCO
演化博弈
green retrofit
government regulation
owner
ESCO
evolutionary game
