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基于战略风险投资的融资契约设计及融资决策 被引量:8

Financing contract design and financing decision based on strategic venture capital
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摘要 初创企业融资过程中,融资的对象以及合同的设计会对初创企业的经营状态以及社会福利水平产生重要影响.本文将融资的对象分为仅仅追求货币收益的风险投资家和同时追求货币收益及战略目标的战略投资者,并基于此在阶段性融资背景下考察了单个投资者、多个独立投资者以及辛迪加组织这三类融资方式中融资对象的选择和融资契约的设计,最后以社会福利水平最优为首要目标、企业预期收益最大为次要目标为企业家提供最优的融资决策.通过分析表明一个最优的融资决策应当包含最优的融资方式和最优的融资对象.关于融资方式,辛迪加组织提供融资可行时,企业家应寻求辛迪加组织融资且这种融资方式总是社会有效率的;辛迪加组织提供融资不可行时,企业家应寻求多个独立的投资者融资,但这种融资方式无法实现最优的社会福利水平.关于融资对象,企业家应选择努力水平与一阶最优努力水平最为接近的投资者. In the financing process of start-ups,the object of financing and the design of contracts will have an important impact on the operating status of start-up enterprises and social welfare level.In this paper,the objects of financing are divided into venture capitalists who merely pursue monetary income and strategic investors who pursue both monetary returns and strategic objectives.Based on such classification,this paper studies the choice of financing objects and the design of financing contract among three financing methods :single investor,multiple independent investors and syndicate in staged financing.Ultimately,the optimal financing decision for entrepreneurs is given when the primary goal is to social welfare optimization and the secondary target is to maximize an enterprise's expected return.It is shown that an optimal financing decision should include the optimal financing method and the optimal financing object.In the case of financing approach,when a syndicate organization provides financing is feasible,the entrepreneur should seek syndicate financing and this financing method is always socially efficient;when it is not feasible,the entrepreneur should seek financing from multiple independent investors,however,this financing approach cannot achieve the optimal social welfare.Regarding the financing object,the entrepreneur should choose investors whose effort levels are the closest to the first-order optimal effort level
作者 丁川 李爱民 DING Chuan;LI Ai-min(Research Centre of Financial Mathematics,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 610074,China)
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第1期57-79,共23页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671142 71701164 71603212) 四川省软科学项目(2017ZR0118) 教育部人文社科青年资助项目(14XJCZH001) 中央高校基本科研业务费项目(JBK1903005 JBK1805001)
关键词 风险投资家 战略投资者 契约设计 努力 融资 venture capitalist strategic investor contract design effort financing
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