摘要
采购方向两个潜在的供应商之一采购某种需要研发的创新性技术或产品,并采用多属性拍卖机制或研发竞赛机制来确定哪一个供应商最终能赢得合约。假设供应商是同质的和风险中性的、研发成本具有随机性,且采购方和供应商之间在研发成本上信息不对称,分别研究多属性拍卖机制和研发竞赛机制中供应商的质量决策,比较这两种机制的创新激励效应。结果发现:多属性拍卖机制中,理性的供应商都不会进行研发和参与投标;研发竞赛中奖励金额必须要足够大才能激发供应商的研发与竞赛参与意愿,此时研发竞赛机制要优于多属性拍卖机制。
A buyer plans to procure some kind of innovative technology or product that needs R＆D from one of two suppliers, and employs multi-attribute auction or R＆D contest to determine the winner. The paper presumes that the suppliers are identical and risk- neutral, the R＆D cost is stochastic and cost information of the procurer and the suppliers is asymmetric. The quality decision-makings of the suppliers are investigated and innovation incentive effects are compared respectively in multi-attribute auction and R＆D contest. The investigation shows that rational suppliers would not participate in the multi-attribute auction, and the prize should be big enough to motivate the suppliers to take part in the R＆D contest. When the suppliers have the willingness to participate in the R＆D contest, the R＆D contest mechanism is better than the multi-attribute auction mechanism to the buyer.
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
2014年第7期24-27,共4页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630208)
浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题(08ZXSJ039YB)
关键词
多属性拍卖
研发竞赛
拍卖机制
技术创新
Multi-attribute auction
R＆D contest
Auction mechanism
Technology innovation
