摘要
公司治理和政府干预的相关理论是解释国有企业过度投资的重要理论,但是,新时代背景下,难以解释公司治理机制相同的企业过度投资程度却迥然不同,以及政府干预逐步降低而国有企业过度投资依然严重的现象。本文尝试采用高管权力这一新的视角,引入社会心理学理论、委托代理理论和高管权力理论,解释国有企业过度投资严重的问题。本文的实证研究表明,高管权力的增大是国有企业过度投资严重的重要影响因素,特别是当政府干预低时,高管权力能很好地解释国有企业的过度投资问题。进一步研究还发现,高管权力与过度投资的显著正相关关系只在法律环境差和未在香港上市的样本中存在,说明良好的法律环境能对高管产生约束力。同时,建立完善的资本市场体系,有助于降低国有企业高管权力增大带来的过度投资的恶劣后果。本文不仅拓展了高管权力经济后果和企业投资相关领域的理论研究,也对新一轮国有企业改革和企业投资效率的提升提供了新的方向。
The paper studies the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises. There are two main reasons we choose the topic：First, one of the most important problem in China＇s economic development is the enterprise＇s investment efficiency, but Chinese enterprises＇ investment efficiency is not optimistic（ Ying ＆ Luo, 2012）, especially the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises. Liu ＆ Li（2013 ）argue that the state-owned enterprises are eager to develop rapidly and become bigger and stronger, the problem of overinvestment is serious. From this perspective, It is more necessary to study the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises than other types of enterprises. Second, there are shortcomings in the academic literatures of the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises. The existing literatures explain the overinvestment phenomenon of the state-owned enterprises in China mainly from the perspectives of corporate governance and government intervention. The perspective of corporate governance argues that managers have the empire building motivation, and overinvest to obtain private benefits. The perspective of government intervention argues that, China＇s state-owned enterprises are influenced by government intervention, in order to implement targets the government issued, such as keeping a stable employment, raising taxes and increasing GDP, China＇s state-owned enterprises want to overinvest, especially in China＇s decentralization reform, the political performance goal of local government has inspired the intervention of the state-owned enterprises, local governments make the phenomenon of overinvestment of state-owned enterprises more serious. This paper argues that studying overinvestment of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of corporate governance only emphasize the influence of corporate governance mechanism, ignored the heterogeneity of executives. Corporate governance theory argues that the company＇s decision will be the same as long as the corporate governance structure is the same（ Bertrand ＆ Schoar, 2012）, in fact, the hypothesis of the corporate governance is that the executive is homogeneous, it does not accord with the actual, even if the company governance mechanism is the same, due to the influence of personal physical, psychological and personal experience, executives＇ decision will be very different. There is no denying the fact that it is suitable for China＇s national conditions to study the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of government intervention, and has contributed to promote China＇s marketization reform, but along with the advancement of market-based reform, government intervention, less and less, but state-owned enterprises over-investment phenomenon is still serious, can not help but ask, whether there are other reasons？ This paper argues that this part of research also ignores the heterogeneity of executives, especially not considering the fact of executives＇ power become stronger due to the reform of state-owned enterprises, it is difficult to understand the essence of overinvestment of state-owned enterprises deeply and comprehensively. Liu ＆ Jiraporn（2010）argues that the power is one of the important dimensions of executive characteristics, when the company decision-making power concentrated in the hands of corporate executive officer（ CEO）, CEO has the power to impact at the discretion of the company decision, and then the individual will reflect in decision-making. Based on the institutional background of China, studying the phenomenon of overinvestment of state-owned enterprises from the executive power has important theory value and practical significance. This paper uses the new angle of view, the executive power, introducing social psychology theory, principal-agent theory and the theory of executive power, to explain the serious problem of overinvestment of state-owned enterprises. This paper shows that, The increase of the executive power is one of the important factors affecting overinvestment of state-owned enterprises, especially when government intervention is lower, the executive power can explain the overinvestment problem of state-owned enterprises well. The stronger the executive power, the more serious overinvestment problem of state-owned enterprises. Further research also find the significant positive correlation of executive power and overinvestment in the sample of poor legal environment and not listed in Hong Kong. It shows that a good legal environment can have binding force on the executives, at the same time establishing a perfect capital market system, help to reduce bad consequences caused by overinvestment increased by state executive power. This paper not only expand the economic consequences of executive power and the relevant theoretical research in the field of enterprise investment, but also provides a new direction for a new round of reform of state-owned enterprises and promoting the efficiency of corporate investment.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第10期75-87,共13页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"中国上市公司代理问题与股价崩盘风险研究"(14YJC630069)
中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目"商业信用与银行贷款的替代关系:基于控股股东代理问题的研究"(14XNH238)
中财121人才工程青年博士发展基金项目"企业产权
金字塔控股结构与股价信息含量"(QBJ1405)
关键词
国有企业
高管权力
过度投资
state-owned enterprises
executive power
overinvestment
