摘要
This paper proposes a sequential model of bar- gaining specifying reasoning processes of an agent be- hind bargaining procedures. We encode agents＇ background knowledge, demands, and bargaining constraints in logic pro- grams and represent bargaining outcomes in answer sets. We assume that in each bargaining situation, each agent has a set of goals to achieve, which are normally unachievable with- out an agreement among all the agents who are involved in the bargaining. Through an alternating-offers procedure, an agreement among bargaining agents may be reached by ab- ductive reasoning. We show that the procedure converges to a Nash equilibrium if each agent makes rational offers/counter- offers in each round. In addition, the sequential model also has a number of desirable properties, such as mutual commit- ments, individual rationality, satisfactoriness, and honesty.
This paper proposes a sequential model of bar- gaining specifying reasoning processes of an agent be- hind bargaining procedures. We encode agents＇ background knowledge, demands, and bargaining constraints in logic pro- grams and represent bargaining outcomes in answer sets. We assume that in each bargaining situation, each agent has a set of goals to achieve, which are normally unachievable with- out an agreement among all the agents who are involved in the bargaining. Through an alternating-offers procedure, an agreement among bargaining agents may be reached by ab- ductive reasoning. We show that the procedure converges to a Nash equilibrium if each agent makes rational offers/counter- offers in each round. In addition, the sequential model also has a number of desirable properties, such as mutual commit- ments, individual rationality, satisfactoriness, and honesty.
