期刊文献+

代理成本和应计及真实盈余管理——基于产权视角的实证研究 被引量:7

Agency Costs and Accrual Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management: An Empirical Research from Perspective of Ownership Property
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文基于CSMAR数据库2010—2012年深沪上市的A股数据,从产权性质视角研究代理问题和应计盈余管理及真实活动盈余管理的关系,结论表明:第一,全样本中代理成本和应计盈余管理及真实活动盈余管理正相关;第二,代理成本和盈余管理的关系在国有控股和非国有控股公司中存在显著差异,且二者的关系在国有控股样本中更显著。本文对于提高公司的内外部监管,完善治理结构、降低代理成本以及公司盈余管理程度具有一定的参考意义。 Recently, researchers are interested in earnings management from capital market. This paper uses A-share data from Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from year 2010 to 2012 from CSMAR. From perspective of ownership property, we want to study relationships between agency problems and earnings management, which we mean accrual earnings manage- ment(AEM) and real earnings management(REM). Our paper find that: Firstly, in the full sample, there is a positive rela- tionship between agency costs and AEM, the same to REM; Secondly, in State-Owned and non State-Owned samples, the rela- tionship between agency costs and earnings management is significantly different, the significant positive relationship in State- Owned sample is much higher than that of non State-Owned samples. Our paper aims to enhance supervising managers from in- side and outside aspects, and to improve corporate governance structure, reduce corporate agency costs and management earn- ings management.
出处 《南京财经大学学报》 2015年第3期49-63,共15页 Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics
关键词 代理成本 应计盈余管理 真实活动盈余管理 公司治理 产权性质 ageney costs aecrual earnings management real earnings management corporate governance ownership property
  • 相关文献

参考文献46

  • 1Jensen, M. , Meckling, W. Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure [ J ]. Jour- nal of Financial Economics, 1976 ( 3 ) : 305 - 360.
  • 2Schipper K. Commentary on Earnings Management[ J ]. Accounting Horizons, 1989 (4) : 91 - 102.
  • 3Lin, J. Y. , and G. Tan. Policy Burdens, Accountabil- ity, and the Soft Budget Constraint [ J ]. American Eco- nomic Review, 1999 (89) :426 - 431.
  • 4Ang J S, R A Cole, J W Lin. Agency Costs and Owner- ship Structure[ J]. Journal of Finance ,2000,55 ( 1 ) :81 - 106.
  • 5Singh, M. , Davidson, W. N. Agency Costs, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Mechanisms [ J 1. Journal of Banking and Finance,2003 ( 27 ) :793 - 816.
  • 6Firth, M. ,M. Y. Fung, and O. M. Rui. Ownership Governance Mechanisms and Agency Costs in China's Listed Firms [ J ]. Journal of Asset Management, 2008,9 (2) :90- 101.
  • 7John A. Doukas, Christos Pantzalis. Geographic Diver- sification and Agency Costs of Multinational Firms[ J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2003 (9) :59 - 92.
  • 8曾颖,叶康涛.股权结构 代理成本与外部审计需求[J].会计研究,2005(10):63-70. 被引量:86
  • 9李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007,42(1):102-113. 被引量:417
  • 10杨淑娥,王映美.大股东控制权私有收益影响因素研究--基于股权特征和董事会特征的实证研究[J].经济与管理研究,2008(3):30-35. 被引量:14

共引文献3111

同被引文献87

引证文献7

二级引证文献9

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部