摘要
胡塞尔关于“原初生活世界”的分析可以依动态构造法则和静态内容而做区分。在他那里，就作为内容面向的生活世界而言．有关历史的先天和历史目的论的现象学分析构成其主要内容。但胡塞尔的历史现象学没有同等公正地对待历史和哲学。利科关于记忆、遗忘和虚构想象的研究可以被看作对内容面向的生活世界的修正和进一步发展，它们分别揭示了人类记忆的历史处境、遗忘的存在处境和想象的“彼在”存在论。据此，生活世界的内容可被刻画为作为记忆（遗忘）和希望（失望）的生活世界。对这一人类存在论基础内容的关注是哲学家的使命，依此关怀，哲学家能够在伦理和政治的现实层面给予人们振聋发聩的提醒。
Husserl's analysis about 'original life-world' can be distinguished in terms of dynamic constituting law and static content. In Husserl, phenomenological analyses about historical a priori and historical teleology constitute the main parts of the content of life-world. However, his historical phenomenology did not deal with history and philosophy justly. Paul Ricoeur's researches about memory, forgetting and imagination can be considered as modification and further development of this content dimension of life-world. They respectively reveal the history condition of human memory, the existential situation of forgetting and the ontology of 'nowhere' of imagination. In view of the above, the content of life world can be characterized as the life-world of memory and forgetting, of hope and disappointment. It is the mission of philosophers to pay close attention to this ontological foundation. On the base of this concern, they can give remarkable remind at the practice level of ethics and politics.
出处
《哲学分析》
2015年第3期3-16,共14页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
国家社科基金项目“现象学与解释学中的想象力问题研究”(项目编号:14CZX042)研究成果
关键词
生活世界
记忆
历史现象学
遗忘
想象
希望
life world
memory
phenomenology of history
forgetting
imagination
hope
