期刊文献+

基于博弈论的完全信息下的驾驶行为研究 被引量:11

Research of Driving Behavior under Condition of Complete Information Based on Game Theory
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摘要 为了提供必要的理论依据来定量分析信息服务下的驾驶行为,提出了符合驾驶行为特征的理论模型。在完全信息的假设条件下,基于驾驶员个人对速度的期望,分析了驾驶过程中的博弈行为和相应驾驶行为意图的变化,建立了前后车之间的博弈矩阵模型。通过分析实例中的速度收益变化发现:基于原车道前后车的驾驶行为只决定了驾驶行为意图,其换道比例大于实际行驶中的换道比例;如果同时考虑邻道前后车的影响,换道比例更接近实际情况;不同速度区间的速度收益随时间推移逐渐接近期望速度,所处的速度区间越小,收益幅度越大,所需达到稳定的时间越久。 In order to provide the necessary theoretical basis for quantitative analysis of driving behavior under information service, the theoretical model conforming to driving behavior characteristics is put forward. Under the assumed condition of complete information, based on driver's personal expectation of speed, the game behavior in the process of driving and the change of the corresponding driving behavior intention are analyzed, and the game matrix model between front and following cars is established. By analyzing the change of speed gains in the example, it is found that ( 1 ) the driving behavior of front or following car based on the original lane only determines the driving behavior intention, and its lane changing rate is greater than the actual rate ; (2) if considering the influence of front and proportion of lane changing is closer to actual situation; close to the expected speed over time, the smaller the speed the longer the needed stable period to reach. following cars of adjacent lane at the same time, (3) the gains of different speed range gradually range, the greater the gain margin will be, and the longer the needed stable period to reach.
出处 《公路交通科技》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2015年第7期105-111,共7页 Journal of Highway and Transportation Research and Development
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(51008196 51308409) 上海市一流学科资助项目(XTKX2012)
关键词 交通工程 驾驶行为 博弈论 完全信息 期望速度 traffic engineering driving behavior game theory complete information expected speed
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参考文献12

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