摘要
为解决当前单一来源装备采购价格合同对装备性能提升无有效激励等问题,以目标价格合同为基础,引入承制单位努力成本,从理论上探讨成本是否具有确定性和有无隐藏努力成本等不同情形下的性能激励和成本激励的相互关系,并研究了性能激励奖励金的优化设计问题,指出了不同情形下目标价格激励合同设计的可行性和方法,进一步提升了目标价格合同在装备采购领域的适用性。该研究方法和思路不仅对军方单一来源采购项目有直接指导作用,同时对政府采购也具有良好的参考价值。
Considering a single-source equipment acquisition price contract cannot give a manufacturer an effective incentive to improve the performance of equipment, this paper uses the target price con- tract as a basis and takes the cost of effort done by the manufacturer into account to study the relation- ship between performance incentive and cost incentive under different conditions of cost certainty or uncertainty with or without implicit cost of effort. Based on the above analysis, the optimal incentive scheme is discussed and the method of designing an optimal target price contract according to different conditions is proposed so as to promote the application of the target price contract to equipment acqui- sition. The proposed method is of much reference value to a single-source equipment acquisition pro- ject as well as to a government acquisition project.
出处
《海军工程大学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2015年第4期50-53,79,共5页
Journal of Naval University of Engineering
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(13GJ003258)
海军工程大学自然科学基金资助项目(HGDQNEQJJ13013
HGDNSQJJ15006)
关键词
目标价格合同
装备采购
成本激励
性能激励
努力成本
target price contract
equipment acquisition
cost incentive
performance incentive
costof effort
