摘要
本文以薪酬契约为视角,研究亲缘对家族企业起到的特殊作用:家族企业实际控制人与CEO的亲缘关系能否降低对薪酬契约的需求,亲缘自身能否提供有效激励。本文将上市家族企业CEO按是否创业、是否与实际控制人存在亲缘关系、以及亲缘远近分类,以薪酬业绩敏感性表示契约的激励力度,以ROA与Tobin Q表示经济后果,实证结果显示:实际控制人自任CEO,薪酬契约需求最低,经济后果最好。排除创始人效应,实际控制人的家族成员任CEO,相对于非家族CEO,对薪酬契约的需求更低,会计业绩更好。本文指出亲缘在家族企业中起到的特殊作用是影响契约关系,使得家族企业有别于其他企业,亲缘降低了对薪酬契约的需求,同时亲缘自身实现了有效激励,对公司业绩有积极作用。
We study the special function of family relationship by examining if the family relationship between CEO and ultimate controller reduces the demand on compensation contract,and if family relationship itself motivates the firm performance. We identify whether the CEO is founder,whether the CEO has family relationship with ultimate controller,and the magnitude of family relationship. Results show that: the ultimate controller serving as CEO demands least for compensation contract but performs best; among non- founder CEOs,family CEOs have lower demand for compensation contract and better accounting performance than non- family CEOs. The results indicate that the special role of family relationship is to affect the contractual relationship in family firms. Our findings imply that family relationship decreases the demand on explicit contract,and functions as an implicit contract stimulating a better firm performance.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第8期32-40,96,共9页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71372118)的资助
