摘要
本文在一个隐性担保的大国任命制分权架构中,构建内嵌政治激励的博弈模型,分解了地方政府举债融资秉持的救助预期。结果发现,地方政府救助预期受晋升考评压力、成本自担份额、中央救助倾向影响,在卸责心理驱使下,地方政府寄望通过"公共池"分享举债成本和谋求事后救助,但无论基于人口规模还是外部性压力的"大而不倒"假说,都不适于解释中国的地方政府债务规模膨胀。以新兴国家的共性基础和大国相对独特的融资环境为条件,随传统治理模式释放的策略性举债加剧了地方政府资产负债期限结构错配,诱发偿债压力的区域布局失衡,风险在流动性层面积聚;但流动性风险管控恰能彰显大国制度优势。本文进而认为,从"加力"到"增效"的治理模式的转换,有助硬化地方预算约束,塑造后危机时代地方政府举债融资的大国治理之道。
In a decentralized federation under implicit guarantee of appointment system, this paper constructs a game model comprising political incentive between central and local government, and decomposes local government＇s bailout expectation. The results indicate that bailout expectation is affected by promotion evaluation pressure, self-supported cost share and bailout inclination of central government. Driven by motive of shirking responsibility, local government is committed to pass on debt obligation to the common pool. But the theoretical basis of the hypothesis of ＂too big to fail＂ is not suitable for China＇s debt expansion, regardless of population size or externality pressure. Conditioned by common foundation and unique financing environment, strategic debt financing aggravates term mismatch of asset and liability, which leads to imbalance distribution of debt service burden. But China has institutional advantage to control hidden liquidity risks. The transformation of governance pattern will harden budget constraint, which should he the way to manage China＇s local government debt financing of post-crisis era.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期81-95,共15页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“中国地方财政隐性赤字的规模估测、风险量化与动态监管研究”(71203106)资助
关键词
救助预期
公共池激励
策略性举债
大国治理模式
Bailout Expectation
Common Pool Incentive
Strategic Debt Financing
China＇s Governance Pattern
