摘要
基于薪酬辩护的假说,本文以2003-2012年间的A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了内部收入差距对高管行为的影响。结果显示,当企业内部的收入差距相对过大时,高管人员会做出种种薪酬辩护行为,可能会通过盈余管理来对业绩进行调整,也可能会在薪酬契约中增加较好业绩指标的权重。进一步研究证实,在内部收入差距相对过大的情况下,国有企业高管的辩护动机更强,其辩护行为也更加明显,同时权力较小的管理者往往通过盈余管理虚构业绩的方式来进行薪酬辩护,而权力较大的管理者往往通过增加有利业绩指标权重的方式来进行薪酬辩护。本文从业绩指标的调整和选择两方面对管理者的薪酬辩护行为进行检验,考察了在不同环境下管理者实施薪酬辩护的具体路径选择,不仅为薪酬辩护假说提供了新的证据,同时也在某种程度上丰富了有关内部收入差距经济后果的研究文献。
Based on the hypothesis of pay defense, this paper takes the A-type shares of listing corporation between 2003 and 2012 as a sample, and empirically tests the impact of internal income gap on the executive behavior. The results show that when income gap between executives and ordinary employees is too large, these executives would have strong incentives to defend themselves for their high pay which can easily cause strong question from public voice, and once these managers are ready to defend themselves for their high pay, they may do some earnings management to make up profit, or they may increase the weight of good performance indicators in their compensation contract. Further research also confirms that when income gap between executives and ordinary employees is too large, the defense motivation is much stronger in stateowned enterprises than that in private enterprises, and managers who have less power in board often defend themselves by earnings management, while managers who have greater power in board often defend themselves by increasing the weight of good performance indicators in their compensation contract. For the moment, researches on pay defense are quite limited, which still need further study and discussion. Some scholars point out that managers will defend for their high pay from two aspects which are the legitimacy of the results and the legitimacy of the procedures, and they also point out that improving pay performance sensitivity is the main method to prove the legitimacy of the results. On the basis of these previous studies, we do some further extension to test the pay defense behavior of executive from the adjustment and the selection of performance indicators, and examine the specific path of managers to implement compensation defense in different environments. Generally speaking, our study not only provides new evidence for the research on pay defense, confirms some speculation of pay defense theory, but also enriches the research literature on the economic consequences of internal income gap, which may have a meaningful reference guide for government regulators and supervisors.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期32-41,共10页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71272114)资助
