摘要
在政府为投资方设定超额收益分享制度的基础上,分析了投资方在参与项目活动时可能出现的投机行为,从而将激励制度引入项目管理的活动中,建立了政府部门与投资方之间的激励-努力博弈模型。通过模型分析得出,奖励金额和惩罚额度的增加并不总是促使投资方行为向高努力转变,只有设定合理的奖惩制度才能实现预期的激励效果,而这一奖惩额度的设定与投资方和政府部门的风险偏好相关。
PPP（public-private partnership）has been rapidly developed around the world. Due to the nature of huge investment, long concessional period and great risk, risk sharing is one of major problems in PPP projects. Unreasonable risk sharing would increase investment cost as well as eventually lead to project failure.The government＇s guarantee can share risks of investors. For example, investors could get option value from the lowest income guarantee which is provided by government. In the meanwhile, when investors＇ revenue is higher than the agreed one, the government has the right to share the excess return which is generated by investors. However, investors may reduce earnings deliberately in order to avoid sharing additional revenue with government. As a result, a government can take reward and punishment incentive mechanisms to avoid the occurrence of this kind of speculation. According to investors＇ different kinds of profitability and the degree of cooperation with the government, they have been divided into five types. Firstly, a company＇s operational management ability is great and its revenue can remain higher than the agreed upper line. Secondly, a company may have certain profitability; however, they may have fluke mind during working. Thirdly, this kind of investors may lack of experience, but have a high degree of cooperation. Fourthly, these enterprises have the ability to obtain high yields, but their cooperation is not strong, which means they are more focused on their own interests rather than public interest. The last one has poor profitability and the degree of cooperation is general. Government may inevitably encounter various situations when choosing cooperators. In the face of different characteristics of investors, government could determine its profitability by examining projects which investors has participated in the past, such as collecting companies＇ economic indicators（e.g. internalrate of return, investment income rate）. Since appropriate incentives could be settled based on investors＇ different characteristics. social benefits would be maximized. In addition, government incentives are always evolving. In the beginning of a project, incentives could be set based on companies＇ performance in the past. During cooperation, investors＇ behavior may change. A government should adjust incentives according to actual situations in order to achieve effective incentive goals. According to the minimum income guarantee provided by government and sharing ratio of over revenue between public and private parties, this paper analyzes investors＇ opportunistic behavior when participating in a project. Incentive systems have been introduced into project management activities. The incentive- efforts game model between government departments and investment party has been established. Our analysis results show that increasing the amount of rewards and punishment could not always motivate investors to choose high effort. Only reasonable incentive rewards and penalties that are related to government and investors＇ risk preferences could achieve the desired incentive effect.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期223-232,共10页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901065)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(13BGL150)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0703)
关键词
PPP项目
风险偏好
激励
努力
博弈
PPP project
risk preference
incentive
efforts
game theory
