摘要
我国《反垄断法》设置了四个行为类型化的原则,即企业行为与政府行为两分、单方行为与多方行为有别、事先审查与事后审查分割、横向行为与纵向行为相离。这在降低执法难度的同时也带来自身所无法解决的问题:任何分类体系都不具有绝对性,而由此滋生的跨界行为又会引发适法错误。我国联合抵制第一案中所暴露的问题正是由此而起。本文经过比较法研究发现我国《反垄断法》中的联合抵制在来源上具有多重性的特点,其类型化原则取材于欧盟,但处理模式却又借鉴自美国。这种二元但却不一统的矛盾正是解决联合抵制分析困境的关键。为了调和这种矛盾,本文对联合抵制做出了进一步的类型化分析,进而对其子类别分别构建了分析框架。
China＇s Antimonopoly Law sets four principles to categorize antitrust conduct, i.e. bifurca tion between enterprise conduct and governmental conduct, partition between unilateral conduct and mul tilateral conduct, division between ez ante review and ex post review, and divarication between horizon tal conduct and vertical conduct. These principles exemplify abstract antitrust jurisprudence, and thus significantly lower the thresholds for enforcement. It nevertheless brings about issues pertaining to non exclusivity of categorization, and inevitably leads to mistakes in enforcement. This problem exactly un derlies the milestone boycott case in China. The comparative study of this article reveals that the sources for boycott are diversified for the categorical principle comes from the EU while the analytical framework is borrowed from the US. This contradiction points to the key to solving the problem. In order to mitiga ting the problem it, this article further categorizes boycott, and sets different analytical framework per its sub-categories
出处
《中外法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期1038-1056,共19页
Peking University Law Journal
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大攻关项目(15JZD018)的阶段性成果
