摘要
本文从导致国有企业腐败的不同类型代理成本出发,构建了代理成本的五种异化表现对国有企业绩效影响的内在机理,并立足中国2008—2015年国有上市公司的数据,对不同代理成本进行分类和度量。本文通过研究发现,国有企业高管权力寻租、在职消费及关联交易等以权谋私行为问题较为突出,给企业绩效带来显著的负效用;对社会责任的承担在一定程度上会损害国有企业内部利益相关者的短期利益,增加媒体曝光度有助于通过外在监督与约束提高企业的经营效益。此外,现有国有企业两职合一比例较高,政治关联日益紧密会放大代理成本对企业经营绩效的作用,但其影响机制在不同国有企业分组测量的结果中存在差异。本文研究为深化国有企业改革和分类治理提供了新的理论视角。
This paper starts from the different types of corruption in SOE,constructs the internal mechanisms of five kinds of agency-cost dissimilation that influence the SOEs performance,and based on the data of Chinese state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2015,classifies and measures these agency costs. This study shows that the major problems of power renting,on-the-job consumption and related transactions for private benefits bring significant negative effect to the enterprise performance. Social responsibility is likely to damage the short-term interests of the internal stakeholders,but will increase the media exposure that may improve the enterprise performance via external supervision and constraint. Furthermore,the CEO duality in SOEs and the increasingly close political associations will enlarge the effect of agency cost on business performance,but the influence mechanisms are different in the measurement of classified SOEs. This research offers a new theoretical perspective to the SOE reform and classified governance.
出处
《浙江工商大学学报》
CSSCI
2016年第6期67-75,共9页
Journal of Zhejiang Gongshang University
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于策略互动实验方法的大股东控制权私利形成机理研究:影响因素与伦理决策"(71272143)
浙江省自然基金项目"基于制度合法性与行为有效性相结合的上市公司董事会治理有效性以及浙江实证"(LY16G020005)
关键词
代理成本异化表现
机会主义行为
国有企业分类治理
大股东掏空
agency-cost dissimilation
opportunism behavior
SOE classified governance
large shareholders tunneling
