摘要
本文以2004—2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了国有和民营参股股东对公司绩效的影响及其作用机制。实证结果显示,"混合所有"的股权结构提高了公司绩效,但国有资本之间的股权多元化对公司绩效没有正面影响。进一步研究发现,民营参股增强了国企管理层的薪酬和离职对业绩的敏感度,国有参股减轻了民企的税负和融资约束,并且在市场化越低时异质性参股股东对绩效的影响越积极。这一结果表明,在中国这一转型经济体中,"混合所有"有助于弥补市场化的不足,异质性股东的"互补"使企业发挥了不同所有制资本的优势,但需要避免在改革中引入新的不平等或低效率。本文对混合所有制改革提供了重要依据,也为公司治理领域提供了中国的独特案例。
Summary： There are two key features of transitioning economies： the prevalence of state ownership and the progress of marketization. This study investigates the effect of non-controlling state and private shareholders on firm performance, and links these effects to the level of marketization. A large stream of corporate governance research investigating the effects of non-controlling shareholders （NCS） on firm performance has been produced over the past 20 years. We argue that the identities of the NCS and the institutional environment are important to shaping outcomes attributable to the presence of the NCS. The management of SOEs （ i. e. , where the controlling shareholder is state-owned） is generally less marketed than that of private firms due to the government＇s probable choice of social and political policy goals over profit maximization and its greater information asymmetries. As a result, in SOEs, privately owned NCS generate value because they have the incentives and voting power to constrain the political objectives of the controlling state-owned shareholder. Conversely, private firms often face unequal treatment in financing and taxation in less marketized economies. State-owned NCS can bring political connections to private firms, help overcome market and state-level disadvantages and seek government-related benefits （＂ political connections effect＂）. In a transitioning economy, heterogeneity among shareholders is complementary because it takes advantage of different ownership. These effects can weaken with the progress of marketization and partly explain the conflicting results in the literature. Being one of the largest transitioning economies, China provides an ideal setting in which to examine the mixed evidence on the effect of NCS. As an outcome of SOE reform, there are a large number of state-/privately owned NCS in firms listed on the Chinese stock market. In addition, during the past decade, in which China has transitioned from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy （ an ongoing transition） , the unbalanced development of its different regions has provided improved variation across levels of marketization, enabling us to better understand the governance role of NCS. We construct a new database by gathering ownership data from more than 20,000 annual reports. We empirically investigate the governance role of privately and state-owned NCS on firm performance in private firms and SOEs, respectively. We find that （ 1 ） the presence of private NCS is associated with better firm performance in SOEs and private firms, with the effects in SOEs being generally larger, and （2） state-owned NCS improve the performance of private firms, but this leads to worse performance in SOEs. That is, mixed ownership is beneficial for both SOEs and private firms. Our results also show that private ownership strengthens the relationship between managers＇ wages, turnover and firm performance in SOEs, and that state ownership alleviates the tax burden and financing constraints in private firms. The effect of mixed ownership is more pronounced in less marketized regions. This paper lends support to the ongoing ＂mix-ownership reform＂ in China, which encourages the private sector to invest in SOEs because mixed ownership makes up for the lack of marketization. Given the long march toward complete marketization, mixed ownership could be a long-lasting phenomenon, beneficial to both SOEs and private firms along the way. However, the logic underlying the effect of mixed ownership is different for SOEs and private firms. Furthermore, the results show that state-owned NCS generate little, if any, value in SOEs.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期122-135,共14页
Economic Research Journal
关键词
国有参股
民营参股
公司治理
混合所有制
Non-controlling State Shareholders
Non-controlling Private Shareholders
Corporate Governance
Mixed- ownership Reform
