摘要
为分析公交运营方如何能够高效地满足出行者的乘车需求,基于博弈理论建立公交需求者的乘车博弈模型及公交需求群体与公交运营方的博弈模型,并进行算例分析,分析结果表明,个体公交需求者的时间成本会影响其策略的选择,为保证自身的收益,不同时间成本的需求者会有不同的选乘倾向;针对个体而言,公交运营方策略改变的可能性较小;而对于乘车群体博弈,可以通过改变公交运营方运营成本影响因素中的可控变量,得到最大限度满足公交需求者乘车需求的均衡.
In order to analyze how the bus operator could satisfy the demands efficiently for passengers, the ride game of the bus demander and the game between bus demanders and an operator are estab- lished based on Game Theory. By analyzing a numerical example, the results showe that： the travel- er＇s time-cost of the individual will affect his choice of the strategy to ensure his own benefits; the traveler＇s different time-value will determine people＇s tendency of choice. As an individual, the possibility of change choice of the public transport operator is small. But for travels groups, the balance of maximally meeting the demand of travelers taking the public transit will be achieved by changing the influence factor of the controllable variables in game.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报（交通科学与工程版）》
2017年第4期708-712,共5页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology（Transportation Science & Engineering）
基金
国家自然科学基金项目资助(51108040)
关键词
交通工程
公交发车频率
博弈论
纳什均衡
不完全信息
traffic engineering
bus departure frequencyl game theory
Nash equilibrium
incomplete information
