摘要
内部审计是公司治理的基石之一,内部审计机构隶属关系直接决定了内部审计的组织地位,影响着内部审计人员的客观性。本文以委托代理理论和成本交易理论为基础,通过对2009—2016年深圳证券交易所国有上市企业内部审计与纪检监察合署办公的动因和经济后果进行研究,发现内部审计与纪检监察是否合署办公同时受管理因素与治理因素的影响,但是市盈率与国有上市企业合署办公没有显著的相关性。
Internal audit is one of the cornerstones of corporate governance. The subordinate relationship of internal audit institutions directly determines the organizational status of internal audit and affects the objectivity of internal auditors.Based on principal-agent theory and cost transaction theory, this paper studies the causes and economic consequences of internal audit and Discipline Inspection and Supervision offices of state-owned listed enterprises in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009-2016. It is found that internal audit and discipline inspection are affected by both management and governance factors, but there is no significant correlation between price-earnings ratio and the co-location of state-owned listed enterprises.
作者
祝遵宏
黄莎莎
Zhu Zunhong1;Huang Shasha2
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期121-132,共12页
Finance & Economics
基金
西藏自治区社会科学基金重点项目“财政审计推动西藏地方治理的理论与路径”(17AJY005)
南京审计大学政府审计研究基金重点项目“财政审计推动国家治理的理论与路径研究”(GASA161012)
关键词
内部审计
纪检监察
合署办公
国有企业
Internal Audit
Discipline Inspection and Supervision
Co-location
State-owned Enterprises
