摘要
邻避冲突治理过程中的地方政府行为值得关注。以"主体-机制-目标"为分析框架,对典型邻避冲突案例开展实证考察和比较研究发现,地方政府邻避冲突治理行为主要表现为被动型递阶强制模式,具有政府垄断邻避冲突治理权力、隐蔽式邻避设施设址决策、格式化的被动反应方式、递阶强制型强制机制等特征。邻避冲突治理过程中的地方政府行为目标表明,"底线治理型政府"是形塑地方政府邻避冲突治理行为选择的基本逻辑。
As a special contentious politics, it's of important significance to study the behavior of local government in NIMBY conflicts. Making an experimental and comparative case study on 20 typical NIMBY conflict cases by using the analysis framework of subject, mechanism, and goal, this paper finds that the behavior of local government in NIMBY conflict is a picture of formative, passive and coercion extent increased progressively model with the basic characteristics of a sole governance subject of government monopoly for the governance power, a concealed decision making style for the sitting of NIMBY facility, a formative passive response pattern to the NIMBY resistance of citizens, and a government coercion mechanism with the coercion extent increased progressively. The behavioral goals of the local government in the NIMBY conflict governance progress show that the behavioral logic of government coercion model is the bottom line based government, which takes economy development, social stabilization, and party leadership as its bottom line for governance.
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第8期119-125,共7页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
国家社科基金项目“邻避型群体性事件生成机理与治理机制研究(编号:18BZZ075)
温州市哲学社会科学规划项目“邻避冲突治理政策工具研究”(编号:17wsk050)
关键词
邻避冲突治理
地方政府
行为逻辑
底线治理型政府
NIMBY conflict governance
local government
behavioral logic
bottom line based government