摘要
本文研究环境检测领域政府监管部门、第三方环境检测机构、排污企业3个主体在信息不对称与有限理性情况下的行为选择问题,为政府加强环境质量管理提供重要的指导意义。本文基于演化博弈理论,构建第三方与排污企业之间的协调均衡博弈模型和第三方与排污企业合谋构成的利益集团与政府监管部门之间的非对称演化博弈模型,研究行为主体的策略选择问题并利用Matlab仿真不同参数变化时模型的演化均衡策略。结果表明:惩罚额度、监管力度、监管成本是分别影响监管部门、排污企业、第三方检测机构演化稳定策略的关键因素,最后从资格审查、竞争机制、信息系统、奖惩机制方面给出政府加强环境质量监管的建议,从而更加有效地抑制环境检测领域数据造假行为。
The paper studies on the behavior choice of three subjects of government regulatory authorities,third-party environmental organization institutions and pollutant enterprises in the case of information asymmetry and limited rationality in the field of environmental testing,provides important guiding significance for the government to strengthen environmental quality management.Based on the theory of evolutionary game,this paper constructs a coordination and equilibrium game model between the third party and pollutant enterprises,and asymmetric evolutionary game model between interest groups formed by the third party and pollutant enterprises and government regulatory authorities.This paper studies the strategy selection of the subjects and uses Matlab to simulate the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model when different parameters change.The results show that the change of the three parameters of the amount of punishment,regulatory strength and the regulatory cost of the regulatory authorities will affect the evolution and stability strategy of the regulatory authorities,pollutant enterprises and the third-party respectively.Finally,the paper gives some suggestions to strengthen the environmental quality regulatory from the aspects of qualification,competition mechanism,information system,reward and punishment mechanism,so as to suppress the illegal data falsification in the field of environmental inspection more effectively.
作者
李健
薛程
Li Jian;Xue Cheng(School of Economics,Liao Ning University,Shenyang 110036,China;Liaoning Environmental Monitoring & Experiment Center,Shenyang 110161,China)
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期58-66,共9页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
关键词
协调均衡博弈
非对称演化博弈
监管部门
第三方
质量监管
排污企业
coordination and equilibrium game
asymmetric evolutionary game
regulatory authorities
the third-party
quality regulatory
pollutant enterprises
