摘要
本研究基于一个“强干预式偏差”不能充分解释的农村低保偏差案例,通过对该案例的分析剖析瞄准偏差生产的另一种政策执行过程。在精准扶贫的背景下,基层执行者的强干预特性得到了遏制。石村低保实践中的内含性瞄准偏差得到了很大程度的纠正,瞄准精度有所提高,但是排斥性偏差仍然是较为突出的问题。面对强大的执行压力,县级政府、乡镇政府和村组干部采取了目标一致、策略各异的自我保护方案,共同建构出“自保式低保执行”的行动逻辑。压力型体制和悬浮式政权结合形成了“挤压型体制”,基层执行者通过“选择性治理”和“情境性抽离”实现了“自保式低保执行”。
Against the background of“Targeted Poverty Alleviation”policy,the“strong intervention”of grassroots implementers in Village Shi has been largely curbed and inclusion error has decreased,improving targeting efficiency in general.However,exclusion error still remains a serious problem.Facing strong supervision pressure from higher-level of governments,different levels of grassroots implementers,including county government,township government and village cadres,take different“self-protection”strategies.This results in the action logic of“self-protection oriented dibao implementation”.The pressure system combines with the hanging-in-the-air regime to form a“squeezing system”,in which pressure from higher-level governments and resistance from practice exist simultaneously for grassroots implementers.In response to the“squeezing system”,the grassroots implementers achieve“self-protection”through“selective governance”and“situational withdrawal”in dibao implementation.
出处
《社会学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期188-212,246,共26页
Sociological Studies
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“‘社会政策时代’的中国福利体制属性及其发展趋势研究”(16BSH134)的阶段性成果
