摘要
本文以2013-2017年主板上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了大股东股权质押对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:(1)大股东股权质押与公司业绩负相关;(2)在经营状况不良的公司,大股东股权质押损害公司业绩的程度更高;(3)债权人与机构投资者能显著抑制大股东损害公司业绩的程度,但是,现金股利政策并未发挥出明显的抑制效果。研究的结果支持了公司经营状况不良和三种监督机制要素的治理效应是影响大股东股权质押损害公司业绩程度的观点;因为中国公司存在内部治理体制不完善和外部法律环境障碍的问题,所以债权人、股利政策与机构投资者三种监督机制发挥的治理效应不同,但三大监督机制仍然对其公司发挥了治理效应,使大股东股权质押损害公司业绩的程度降低。
Selected main board listed companies from 2013 to 2017,this paper examines the relationship between the equity pledge of large shareholders and the corporate performance.We find that:(1)there are significant negative relationship between the equity plegde of large shareholders and the corporate performance.(2)in which the companies had bad operational performance,there are more significant negative relationship between the equity plegde of large shareholders and the corporate performance.(3)creditors and cash dividend policy have significantly negative effect on the extent that equity pledge of large shareholders damages the company’s performance,but institutional investors have no significantly effect.These conclusions show that companies which had bad operational performance and the governance effect of three supervision mechanism elements taken by equity pledge of large shareholders damages the company’s performance.Because of internal governance system and external legal environment obstacles reduce the governance effect of three supervision mechanism,the extent of equity pledge of large shareholders damages corporate performance is reduced.
作者
夏一丹
肖思瑶
夏云峰
Xia Yidan;Xiao Siyao;Xia Yunfeng
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第10期59-70,共12页
Finance & Economics
基金
国家自然基金面上项目(71873117)
国家社科基金重点项目(18AJY027)
湖南省社科评奖项目(ZK2Q18001)
关键词
大股东股权质押
公司业绩
三大监督机制
Equity Pledge of Large Shareholders
Corporate Performance
Three Types of Supervision Mechanisms
