摘要
基于信号理论,从内外部信号视角出发,以2012-2018年中国上市科技型中小企业动态面板数据为研究样本,构建聚类稳健双向固定效应计量模型,实证分析政府补助、企业创新以及两者交互作用对外部投资者投资决策的影响机理。结果表明:政府补助向外部投资者传递积极信号,能够给科技型中小企业带来更多的外部投资;高风险的企业创新会抑制外部投资者的投资行为,向外部投资者传递消极信号。政府补助与企业创新的交互作用方面:政府直接补助一定程度上削弱了企业创新对投资者投资决策带来的消极影响,而间接补助则正向调节企业创新产出向投资者传递的消极信号。最后,提出缓解科技型中小企业融资约束的对策建议。
Based on the signaling theory and the perspective of internal and external signals,using thedataofChina'slisted technology-based SMEsfrom2012to2018,the paper develops a clustered robust two-way fixed effect model and empirically tests the influence mechanism of R&D subsidy and enterprise innovation and their interaction on investor’sinvestment decisions.The results show that R&D subsidy is a significant positive correlated with external investor’s investment decision,which can bring more external investment to technology-based SMEs.High-risk enterprise innovation will inhibit the investment behavior of external investor,and send negative signals to external investor.On the interaction between government subsidy and enterprise innovation,direct subsidy can weaken the negative impact of innovation output,while indirect subsidy are positively regulate the negative signals that innovation output delivers to investors.At the end of the paper,some policy suggestions are put forward to ease the financing constraints of technology-based SMEs.
作者
刘新民
宋红汝
范柳
Liu Xinmin;Song Hongru;Fan Liu(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology;Qingdao Agricultural University;College of Mathematics and Systems Science,Shandong University of Science and Technology;Management College,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China)
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期26-33,共8页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71603151)
山东省社科规划研究项目(18CCXJ15)
关键词
政府补助
企业创新
投资决策
信号传递效应
交互作用
Government Subsidy
Enterprise Innovation
Investment Decision
Signaling Effect
Interaction
