摘要
基于供应链理论、Stackelberg博弈论,将处理基金与拆解补贴引入CLSC中,构建政府干预下第三方回收WEEE再制造CLSC两种模式下的定价模型,研究CLSC成员分散决策和集中决策时的定价策略。该研究对WEEE再制造CLSC各成员制定价格策略,提高WEEE再制造CLSC的运作效益具有指导意义,同时也有效促进环境保护,提高社会资源利用率。
Based on the theories of supply chain theory,Stackelberg game theory and,this paper introduces the treatment fund and dismantling subsidy into the CLSC,constructs the pricing model of two models of WEEE reproducing CLSC under the government intervention,and studies the pricing strategy under decentralized decision and under centralized decision. Through the design of revenue-sharing contract,pricing coordination strategy is proposed,and its rationality is verified by numerical examples. The study of guiding significance for WEEE to re-establish the pricing strategy of CLSC members and improve the operational efficiency of WEEE reproducing CLSC,effectively promote environmental protection and thus improve the utilization rate of social resources.
作者
魏秀林
WEI Xiu-lin(Fujian Agriculture Forestry University Dongfang College,Fuzhou 350017,China)
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2020年第3期76-78,共3页
Logistics Engineering and Management
基金
福建农林大学东方学院校级2018年教学科研改革项目的阶段性成果,项目编号(DFKY2018010)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871206,71801199)
教育部人文社科基金资助项目(18YJC630123)。
关键词
闭环供应链
博弈论
政府干预
Closed-loop Supply Chain
game theory
government intervention
