摘要
供应链金融的发展为破解小微企业融资难题提供了新的解决方案,但同时存在着企业无法及时还款的违约现象。为剖析影响供应链企业守约策略选择的影响因素,依托应收账款质押融资模式,构建核心企业与中小企业守约的演化博弈模型,并建立复制动态方程,从动态视角下分析不同情境下核心企业与中小企业的演化稳定策略。研究结果表明:银行贷款利率的降低、违约企业惩罚力度的提升、供应链企业长期稳定合作产生额外收益的提升,将推动核心企业与中小企业选择(守约,守约)的演化稳定策略。最后,根据研究结论提出相应的对策建议,以期降低小微企业的违约风险,推动供应链金融的发展。
The development of supply chain finance provides a new solution to solve the financing problem of small and micro enterprises.But at the same time there is a default phenomenon that enterprises cannot repay in time.To analyze the influencing factors that affect the choice of supply chain enterprises'compliance strategy,this article relies on the pledge financing model of accounts receivable,builds an evolutionary game model of keeping promises between core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises'in different situations from a dynamic perspective.The research results show that the reduction in bank loan interest rates,the increase in penalties for defaulting companies,and the increase in long-term stable cooperation between supply chain companies to generate additional income will promote the evolutionary stabilization strategy of core companies and SMEs choosing(compliance,compliance).Finally,based on the research conclusions,corresponding countermeasures are recommended to reduce the default risk of small and micro enterprises and promote the development of supply chain finance.
作者
刘洋
刘成
LIU Yang;LIU Cheng(School of Economics and Management,Hubei Univ.of Tech.,Wuhan 430068,China)
出处
《湖北工业大学学报》
2020年第3期39-44,共6页
Journal of Hubei University of Technology
关键词
供应链金融
演化博弈
应收账款融资
守约策略选择
supply chain finance
evolutionary game
accounts receivable financing
compliance strategy selection
