摘要
为进一步抑制高危岗位矿工违章行为,基于计划行为理论,从有限理性角度出发,引入安全管理者奖励机制,建立煤矿高危岗位矿工违章行为与安全检查员检查行为博弈模型,构建行为收益感知矩阵,对博弈双方的复制动态方程进行分析。结果表明:当检查力度和惩罚系数一定时,管理者对矿工施加的奖惩方式,主要取决于矿工的风险规避系数;在对一线矿工违章操作施加的惩罚力度不变的情况下,安全检查员加大对一线矿工的检查频率和力度,可以减少违章操作次数;在安全检查员对矿工检查力度不变的情况下,管理者加大对矿工违章行为的惩罚力度,也可以抑制违章行为。
In order to further suppress the miners’violation in high-risk posts,based on the theory of planned behavior and from the perspective of limited rationality,the reward mechanism of safety managers was introduced,the game model of miners’violation in high-risk posts and safety inspectors’inspection was established and the behavioral benefit perception matrix was constructed,the dynamic equation of replication between the two sides of the game was analyzed.The results show that when the inspection intensity and punishment coefficient are constant,the way of reward and punishment imposed by managers on miners mainly depends on the risk aversion coefficient of miners;if the punishment intensity imposed on the first-line miners’violation is unchanged,the increased frequency and intensity of inspection on the first-line miners can reduce the number of violation operation;if there is no change in the intensity of the safety inspectors’inspection of miners,the managers can also suppress the miners’violation by increasing the punishment.
作者
张颖
冀巨海
ZHANG Ying;JI Juhai(Taiyuan University of Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China)
出处
《矿业安全与环保》
北大核心
2021年第1期126-130,共5页
Mining Safety & Environmental Protection
基金
国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金项目(51422404)
教育部产学研协同育人项目(201801114037)
2018年度山西省高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基金项目(晋教科函〔2018〕33号)。
关键词
煤矿安全
演化博弈
计划行为理论
安全检查员
一线矿工
违章行为
coal mine safety
evolutionary game
theory of planned behavior
security inspector
first-line miner
violation
