摘要
为促进大众创业、万众创新,国家税务总局和银保监会联合推出了小微企业新型融资模式——银税互动。本文试图探究银税互动对小微企业融资约束、投融资决策以及纳税行为的影响。研究发现:(1)银税互动可以消除小微企业融资约束;(2)企业投资动机与银行信贷乘数呈U型关系,且对增长率较低的企业,宽松的信贷政策对其投资有较大促进作用;(3)银行更青睐于给增长率较高、波动率较低的小微企业贷款;(4)银税互动对小微企业逃税的抑制作用依赖于银行的信贷政策。本文为银税互动受到政府部门和小微企业青睐提供了新的理论解释,同时也为完善银税互动更好助力小微企业诚信纳税、让小微企业享受到诚信纳税红利提供了理论指导。
In China,there are a large number of small and micro enterprises(SMEs)encountering financing problems and it is difficult or even impossible for them to obtain loans directly from banks.To resolve the SMEs’financing constraints,China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission and the State Taxation Administration have developed a new financial product in 2015,called the bank-tax-interaction(BTI).The BTI is a three-party contract among a bank/lender,the tax department,and a SME/borrower.In the contract,the tax department provides the SME’s historical records of tax payment to the bank and then the bank lends at a given interest rate to the SME mainly based on the historical records.Particularly,the credit line is a certain multiple of the total tax payment for the SME.According to statistics from the State Taxation Administration up to the end of September of 2019,the national banking financial institutions have cumulatively issued 1.609 million loans to credit-worthy SMEs,and the amount of interactive loans used by SMEs with BTI has reached more than CNY 1.57 trillion.BTI has been favored by government and SMEs,and has played an important role in promoting the development of national economy.Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study how BTI affects the financing and investment decisions for SMEs and how to improve BTI to better help the stable and orderly development of SMEs.In this paper,we focused on the following four main questions.First,what is the theoretical mechanism of the impact of the BTI on the financing constraints of SMEs?Can it effectively alleviate or even eliminate the financing constraints of SMEs?Second,how does BTI affect the investment decisions of SMEs?Under what circumstances can it stimulate corporate investment?Third,how does the BTI affect optimal capital structure and bond credit risk premiums?What types of SMEs are banks willing to lend to?Fourth,as an extension of this paper,what is the theoretical mechanism of the influence of the BTI on the corporate tax evasion motivation?Does it have an inhibitory effect on the corporate tax evasion motivation?Based on these four questions,we first described the investment and financing of an SME with the BTI contract under a framework developed by Leland(1994).Second,we analyzed the effects of earnings growth rate,volatility and the credit multiplier on the investment threshold and the credit line.Third,we studied the impacts of earnings growth rate,volatility and the credit multiplier on the optimal capital structure and the bond credit risk premium.Fourth,we discussed the effects of the credit multiplier on the optimal degree of tax payment and the tax evasion value.This paper provides the following novel implications.First,we found that the BTI can eliminate the financing constraints of SMEs.This is because in order to obtain enough credit lines,SMEs will select appropriate investment thresholds to determine their tax lines which makes full use of BTI to obtain the required loan lines.Second,the investment motivation of SMEs and the bank credit multiplier are in a U-shaped relationship,and for SMEs with low growth rates,the loose credit policy has a greater boost to its investment.The intuition behind the result is as follows.When the level of the credit multiplier is in a low range,an increasing credit multiplier will cause SMEs to delay investment.This is because entrepreneur pays more tax by deferring investment,and the tax is multiplied by the corresponding credit multiplier,thereby leading SMEs to access higher credit lines.When the level of credit multiplier is in a high range,its increase will lead entrepreneur to accelerated investment.This is because the higher of the credit multiplier leads entrepreneurs to obtain more credit lines,and thus entrepreneurs will get the value of the project via earlier investment.Third,banks prefer to lend to SMEs with higher growth rates and lower volatility.Fourth,the inhibitory effect of BTI on SMEs’tax evasion depends on the bank’s credit policy.The intuition behind the result is the trade-off between cost effect and benefit effect from paying tax.This paper contributes to the current literature in two ways.It provides a new and potential theoretical explanation for the BTI favored by government departments and SMEs,which supplies the existing investment and financing theory of SMEs.Second,this paper also provides theoretical guidance for improving the BTI to better stimulate SMEs to pay taxes with integrity and allow them to enjoy the dividends of honest taxation.The findings showed in this paper have significant policy implications.First,SMEs should strive to improve their fundamentals in order to obtain a sufficiently high credit line through the BTI.Second,the credit institutions should formulate loose credit policies for SMEs with lower growth rates.Third,it is an important reference for SMEs to balance the advantages and disadvantages of tax payment in the BTI in order to enable healthy development,and thus the credit institutions should formulate reasonable credit policies.
作者
陈彪
罗鹏飞
杨金强
CHEN Biao;LUO Pengfei;YANG Jinqiang(School of Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;College of Finance and Statistics,Hunan University;Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第12期77-93,共17页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家优秀青年科学基金项目(71522008)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772112)
霍英东教育基金会第十五届高等院校青年教师基金(151086)的阶段性成果。
关键词
银税互动
融资约束
小微企业投融资
信贷政策
Bank Tax Interaction
Financing Constraints
Investment and Financing of SMEs
Credit Policy
