摘要
科技创新是经济高质量发展和长期可持续发展的关键。本文以政府引导基金投资中小科技企业和初创企业作为政策自然实验,基于2008—2017年中国沪深A股上市公司微观企业数据,采用渐进双重差分模型和中介效应模型识别政府风险投资对企业创新的作用效果和影响机制。实证结果发现:第一,引导基金不仅没有促进企业创新,反而对企业创新产生了显著的抑制效应。不同监管环境下的分组检验表明,引导基金更倾向于投资风险相对较小的企业,而不是高不确定性和高风险的小微科技企业和初创企业,因而偏离了其投资目标和政策初衷。第二,不同性质私人基金的分组检验表明,相较于股权投资(PE),引导基金和风险投资(VC)的投资目标更难协调,因而对企业创新的负面影响更大。第三,企业的政治关联和寻租会扭曲企业利用引导基金的投资方向。相较于其他类型企业,有政治关联的民营企业研发投入更低,创新产出更低。第四,机制检验表明,研发支出激励不足、公司内部治理不善,是引导基金抑制企业创新的重要渠道。并且,公司制引导基金相较于合伙制基金的创新绩效更差。本文从不同类型基金目标导向冲突、政治关联和寻租等视角在委托代理框架下对上述发现进行了理论分析,发现实证结论与理论分析十分自恰。本研究发现为理解政府风险投资影响企业创新的机理提供了新的线索,对改进政策性基金的投资成效具有重要启示作用。
Based on the micro-enterprise data of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017,this paper empirically studies the effect and influence mechanism of government venture capital on corporate innovation. The results found that:First,the GGF has a significant inhibitory effect on corporate innovation. Group inspections under different regulatory environments show that GGF are more inclined to invest in companies with relatively low risks. Second,the grouping test of different types of private funds shows that,compared with equity investment(PE),it is more difficult to coordinate the investment objectives of GGF and venture capital(VC),which has a greater negative impact on corporate innovation. Third,the political connection and rent-seeking of enterprises can distort the investment direction of enterprises using GGF. Compared with other types of enterprises,politically connected private enterprises have lower R&D investment and lower innovation output. Fourth,the mechanism test shows that insufficient incentives for R&D expenditures and poor corporate governance are important channels for guiding funds to inhibit corporate innovation. This paper analyzes the above findings from the perspectives of different types of fund goal orientation conflicts,political connections and rent-seeking under the framework of principal-agent,and finds that the empirical conclusions and theoretical analysis are very self-consistent. The findings of this study provide new clues for understanding the mechanism of government venture investment affecting corporate innovation,and have important enlightenment for improving the investment effectiveness of policy funds.
作者
徐明
Xu Ming(School of Economics and Trade,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou 510006,China)
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第2期51-67,共17页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71973052)
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(20YJC790154)的资助。
关键词
政府引导基金
寻租
委托代理
企业创新
Government Guidance Fund
Political Connection
Rent-Seeking
Principal-Agent
Enterprise Innovation
