摘要
非上市公司在寻求股权融资的过程中,融资对象、融资方式及融资契约设计对企业融资成功概率和融资绩效产生重要影响。大疆公司的“竞价融资”是近年来我国私募股权融资领域的一大创举。以大疆公司“竞价融资”为背景,本文运用博弈方法构建了信息不对称情形下融资企业与股权投资者之间、股权投资者与股权投资者之间的投融资博弈模型,从理论上探讨股权“竞价融资”与“主动寻求融资”的融资绩效差异。研究结果表明,两种融资方式的融资绩效孰高孰低是不确定的,受到融资中介费用、谈判的机会成本、市场对股权的估值区间等因素影响。数值模拟结果显示,虽然不能直接判断两种融资方式的融资绩效孰高孰低,但“竞价融资”的融资绩效在大多数情况下高于“主动寻求融资”。研究结论可为企业选择融资方式提供一定的参考价值。
Equity financing is a crucial financing method for enterprises.Numerous enterprises have sought financing through initial public offering(IPO)but have been hindered by stringent IPO conditions.Because of the rapid development of China′s capital market,private equity financing has become an important financing method before IPOs by numerous enterprises.In recent years,DJ-Innovations first launches a equity bidding type financing activity of USD 1 billion,surprising the investment and business communities.The equity bidding type financing activity held by DJ-Innovations transforms the dominant relationship between investors and those who finance for investment.This study uses DJ-Innovations′equity bidding type financing as the background to construct game models for equity bidding type financing and proactive financing seeking.In addition,this study combines the two models and compares the financing performances of the two financing methods,in order to provide a reference for enterprises′financing-related decision-making.This study employs the idea of auction game to construct a game model of equity bidding type financing.In addition,this study adopts Rubinstein′s rotational bargaining game theory to construct a game model of proactive financing seeking,and from the perspective of enterprises that finance for their investment,analyzes whether the performance of equity bidding type financing is superior to that of proactive financing seeking.We draw an abstract concept from reality and construct two incomplete-information game models in two situations under several premises.One model is the game model of equity bidding type financing that uses the equity bidding type financing launched by DJ-Innovations as the background.In this model,the game subjects are two investment institutions that bid for equities offered by the enterprise.In the other model,the enterprise proactively seeks funds from investors,and the game subjects are the enterprise and two investment institutions.In both models,the game subjects hold incomplete information.The two financing methods yield different financing performances for the enterprise.By comparing the financing performances of the two financing methods,this study discovers that to determine the financing method with superior financing performance,the information regarding“which investor in order the enterprise will achieve an agreement with when the enterprise proactively seeks financing”must be acquired;subsequently,factors such as financing agency fees,opportunity costs of negotiations,and the market′s valuation of equities must be considered comprehensively.In summary,which of the two financing methods yields superior financing performance is uncertain.The reason is that the financing performance of equity bidding type financing is an interval value,and that the financing performances of the two methods are influenced by numerous factors.Finally,the two models are subjected to a numerical simulation.The results show that although the financing performances of the two methods cannot be compared directly,in most cases,the financing performance of equity bidding type financing is superior to that of proactive financing seeking.The conclusion of this study provides a reference for enterprises in selecting a financing method.When choosing a financing method,an enterprise must comprehensively consider the probabilities of success in negotiations with various investors during proactive financing seeking,the level of commissions paid to agencies,and opportunity costs of negotiations to enhance the efficiency and expected benefits of financing-related decision-making.Numerous enterprises in China are often influenced by other enterprises during their development and blindly imitate other enterprises′development strategies.For example,the equity bidding type financing launched by DJ-Innovations may be imitated by numerous enterprises in the future.Therefore,this study advises against blindly imitating DJ-Innovations′strategy of equity bidding type financing by solely focusing on the DJ-Innovations′large benefits gained from its financing.DJ-Innovations have grown to a certain degree and developed an excellent reputation and brand value,and can thus choose a passive financing method.Although in most situations,the financing performance of equity bidding type financing is superior to that of proactive financing seeking,enterprises should make reasonable financing decisions according to their situations.The contribution of this study lies in the novelty of the research object and the development of an abstract theory and a model for a novel way of equity financing in practice.The conclusion of this study can serve as a reference for enterprises to determine whether to choose private equity bidding type financing in the future.
作者
董礼
陈金龙
DONG Li;CHEN Jinlong(Business School,Huaqiao University,Quanzhou 362021,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第3期179-188,共10页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571074)。
关键词
股权融资
竞价融资
主动寻求融资
融资绩效
博弈论
Equity financing
Bidding type financing
Proactive financing seeking
Financing performance
Game theory
