摘要
本文以2008—2020年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,考察了机构交叉持股对企业商誉泡沫的影响。研究发现,交叉持股的机构投资者可以有效抑制企业商誉泡沫;机制研究表明,交叉持股的机构投资者主要通过降低企业代理成本和信息不对称来抑制企业商誉泡沫;进一步研究发现,在内部控制质量和市场化程度较高的企业中,交叉持股的机构投资者对商誉泡沫的抑制作用更为明显。此外,相比一般法人类机构投资者,金融类机构投资者交叉持股对企业商誉泡沫的抑制作用更显著。本文在理论和实证上丰富了机构交叉持股和企业商誉领域的研究,为监管部门和上市公司化解商誉泡沫提供了新思路和新范式。
Using data of A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2020 in China,this paper studies the effect of institutional cross-blockholding on corporate goodwill bubble.We find that institutional cross-blockholding can decrease the goodwill bubbles.The test of the mechanism shows that institutional cross-blockholding mechanism restrains goodwill bubbles mainly by decreasing agency cost and information asymmetry.The heterogeneity test shows that institutional cross-blockholding has a more significant positive impact on goodwill bubble among the samples of high quality of internal control,and firms in regions with more developed financial intermediaries.Whats more,we find that the restraining effect of financial institutional investors cross-blockholding on goodwill bubbles is better than general legal person institutional investor cross blockholding.
作者
张亚涛
Yatao Zhang(School of Finance,Nankai University)
出处
《经济学报》
CSSCI
2023年第1期125-161,共37页
China Journal of Economics
