摘要
在地方政府财力普遍偏紧的背景下,政社合作成为了政府主导园区开发之外的另一种重要新城建设模式。本文精确匹配了产业新城开发园区的空间地理边界与中国土地市场网提供的土地交易微观信息,构建双重差分模型检验了政社合作产业新城开发模式下的土地出让价格策略及其激励机制。研究发现,产城开发导致新城内土地出让价格显著高于新城外同类型土地出让价格,住宅用地出让价格上涨尤为明显。机制检验表明,地方政府和社会资本追求财政收入增长的相容性内在激励使得园区依赖于土地出让收入来分摊开发成本并维持开发。产城开发显著提高了房产企业的经营绩效水平,非房产企业没有呈现出积极的产出效应,政社合作开发模式呈现出明显的“以房养园”特征。本文研究为如何促进良好的政社合作以及新城的可持续发展提供了事实依据和政策优化方向。
As local governments widely face fiscal constraints,public-private partnership(PPP)has emerged as a new city construction mode,except for the government-led city construction programs.In the PPP mode,private partners are responsible for the whole life cycle of park operation,ranging from infrastructure construction to industrial services.Meanwhile,local governments provide land supplies and development assistance policies to play the role of public partners.Compared to the government-led city development model,PPP projects greatly alleviate fiscal pressure on local governments by cooperating with private partners.Besides,market-oriented private partners are better at selecting and cultivating highend industries which match local production advantages.Therefore,the PPP mode is expected to improve the quality of new city construction.In this study,a critical issue is whether the PPP city construction mode can promote the sustained development of new cities.Based on the land-use-right transfer pricing strategy,this study addresses the above mentioned issue by exploiting the difference-in-differences empirical model.The study shows that PPP-based city construction programs(CCPs for brevity)lead to significant increases in land-use-right transfer prices in industrial parks,and effects are more pronounced for residential land parcels.Furthermore,the study provides causes that can explain the land-use-right transfer pricing strategy under the context of CCPs.To be more specific,local governments have strong incentives to increase fiscal revenue,and they transfer these incentives to private partners by placing performance evaluation indexes as well as pre-determined payment terms.During the construction period,private partners make a large amount of investment in infrastructure construction while returns of the investment are extremely low,indicating a substantial mismatch between investment and returns.Therefore,private partners rely heavily on the reimbursement for investment costs incurred during the construction period which is committed by public partners.CCPs can quickly create fiscal revenues and allocate investment costs with local residents in the short term by enhancing land-use-right transfer prices(especially prices for residential land parcels).In other words,increases in land-use prices maintain the cooperation between public and private partners.Finally,we evaluate sustainable conditions for CCPs.We find that CCPs significantly increase the performance of real estate enterprises but exert a limited positive effect on the performance of non-real estate enterprises.“"Maintaining parks by house sale"becomes a notable mark of CCPs and it causes serious concern for the sustainable development conditions of CCPs.This study reveals prevalent difficulties faced by CCPs.On the one hand,the park development is highly bound up with the real estate market.Once a sudden contraction shock occurs in the real estate market,private partners will face significant challenges in achieving sufficient returns,thereby increasing the failure risks of CCPs.On the other hand,a differentiation strategy in land-use-right transfer pricing makes private partners focus more on real-estate sales and pay less attention to bringing in and cultivating industries.Weak industry agglomeration finally leads to the unsustainable development of CCPs.Therefore,in the PPP mode,it is necessary to clarify responsibilities for both public and private partners.By setting up proper incentive mechanisms,we can make each of the partners bring their advantages into play and improve the development quality of CCPs.Suggestions are as follows.Firstly,local governments are suggested to evaluate the performance of private partners in the operation period rather than in the construction period.Local governments should offer certain guarantees to private partners and pay these guarantees in time.Local governments are also expected to reduce risks for private partners through multi-channels.Secondly,local governments should encourage private partners to focus on the development quality of CCPs with the inclusion of quality-based evaluation indexes.Thirdly,local governments implement dynamic supervision of the sources of private partners'revenues and guide private partners to pay more attention to industrial services and cultivation.
作者
陈思霞
王希瑞
卢盛峰
CHEN Sixia;WANG Xirui;LU Shengfeng(School of Public Finance and Taxation,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;School of Customs and Public Economics,Shanghai Customs College;Economics and Management School,Wuhan University)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第7期191-208,共18页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72073145,72073103)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(22JJD790060)的资助。
关键词
产城开发
财政激励相容
土地出让价格策略
可持续性
CCPs
Compatible Fiscal Incentives
Land-use-right Transfer Pricing Strategy
Sustainability
