摘要
随迁子女义务教育政策是涉及人口规模巨大群体切身利益的重大民生政策,而财政分权体制下中央与地方经费分担比例不合理导致政策落实面临“能力不够”和“意愿不足”的双重困境,但短期内大幅提高中央财政分担比例很难成为政策实践,解决政策落实困境需要从政策体系本身寻求突破口。基于动态演化博弈视角,从地方政府与中央政府的收益函数出发,构建了两级政府随迁子女义务教育政策行为的演化博弈模型,研究博弈过程中主体的策略选择与互动问题,并用Matlab软件对不同情形下的演化均衡策略进行了数值仿真分析。研究结果表明,在随迁子女义务教育政策行为中,地方政府和中央政府都符合有限理性假设,博弈主体在多次博弈中通过不断学习、试错、模仿和调整策略最终达到均衡稳定状态,而均衡稳定策略取决于动态博弈中在政策执行成本、政策监督成本、政策奖惩力度、政绩考核指标等关键因素影响下主体双方的净收益。据此,提出适度上移随迁子女义务教育财政支出责任,创新政绩考核机制,加大政策执行监督力度的建议,将地方政府对随迁子女的财政经费保障情况、随迁子女入学难度情况、随迁子女义务教育数据行为作为监督评价的重点。研究结论有助于解释当前中央政府消极监督、地方政府消极执行情境下随迁子女义务教育政策的落实困境,并为进一步强化监督考评机制,促进流入地政府积极履责,推进政策真正落到实处、惠及民生提供依据。
The policy of compulsory education for migrant children involves a massive population with significant interests.However,the unreasonable proportion of funding sharing between the central and local governments under the fiscal decentralization system has led to a dual dilemma of“inadequate capacity”and“lack of willingness”in policy implementation.In the short term,a significant increase in the central government’s share of financial support is unlikely to be practical,and thus,finding a breakthrough from the policy system itself is necessary to solve the implementation dilemma.Based on the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory,this study constructed an evolutionary game model of policy behavior of two levels of governments for compulsory education for migrant children starting from the utility functions of local and central governments.The study examined the subject’s strategy choices and interaction problems during the game process and used Matlab software to conduct numerical simulation analysis of evolutionary equilibrium strategies under different situations.The research findings indicate that in the behavior of compulsory education policy for migrant children,both local and central governments conform to the assumption of limited rationality.The game subjects achieve equilibrium stability by continuously learning,trying,imitating and adjusting strategies through repeated games.The equilibrium stability strategy depends on the net income of the two subjects under the influence of key factors such as policy execution costs,policy supervision costs,policy rewards and punishments,and performance evaluation indicators in dynamic games.Therefore,this study proposes moderate upward adjustment of fiscal expenditure responsibilities for compulsory education for migrant children,innovative performance evaluation mechanisms and increased policy execution supervision to prioritize the financial guarantee,enrollment difficulties,and data behavior of compulsory education for migrant children by local governments as the focus of supervision evaluation.The research conclusions help to explain the implementation dilemma of compulsory education policies for migrant children under the current situation of the central government’s passive supervision and local government’s passive execution and provide a basis for further strengthening supervision and evaluation mechanisms,promoting proactive responsibility of the government in the destination areas,and ensuring the policy is genuinely implemented to benefit the people.
作者
廖康礼
袁文娟
吴开俊
LIAO Kangli;YUAN Wenjuan;WU Kaijun(Cognitive Science and Interdisciplinary Research Center,Jiujiang University,Jiujiang 332005,China;School of Education,Guangzhou University,Guangzhou 510006,China)
出处
《人口与经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第6期122-137,共16页
Population & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“农民工随迁子女义务教育:中央与地方事权和支出责任划分研究”(71974042)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“超大特大城乡随迁子女义务教育高质量发展的经费保障机制研究”(72373033)
江西省哲学社会科学重点研究基地认知科学与跨学科研究中心重点项目“基于主体认知与行为博弈的随迁子女义务教育政策审计研究”(RZZD202201)。
关键词
随迁子女
义务教育
教育政策
演化博弈
数值仿真
migrant children
compulsory education
education policy
evolutionary game theory
numerical simulation
