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考虑现金补贴的内容平台定价策略选择

Pricing strategy selection for content platforms considering cash subsidies
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摘要 基于多边市场和博弈论理论,针对内容平台建立了免费、收费和现金补贴3种定价策略模型,并通过对各定价策略下的参数进行比较,确定平台最优定价策略.结果表明:广告干扰成本和广告边际收益影响平台定价策略的选择和现金补贴额度的设置,当两者处于特定阈值范围内时采用现金补贴策略,当广告干扰成本非常高时采用收费策略,其他情况下采用免费策略;现金补贴策略下,现金补贴额度与广告干扰成本负相关,与广告边际收益正相关;相同条件下,采用现金补贴策略比其他2种定价策略对各方利益主体和社会福利更好;现金补贴策略和免费策略下的一些参数受广告边际收益的影响趋势相反. Three pricing strategy models—free,charge,and cash subsidy—are constructed for content platforms in a multilateral market based on the game theory.The optimal pricing strategy for a platform is identified by comparing the parameters under each pricing strategy.The results reveal that ad interference cost and ad marginal revenue affect a platform's pricing strategy selection and the cash subsidy amount.The cash subsidy strategy is used when both are within a certain range of thresholds;the charge strategy is adopted when the ad interference cost is very high;and the free strategy is adopted in other cases.In addition,under the cash subsidy strategy,the amount of cash subsidy is negatively correlated to ad interference cost and positively related to ad marginal revenue.Under the same conditions,adopting the cash subsidy strategy is better for all stakeholders and social welfare than the other two pricing schemes.Moreover,ad marginal revenue affects some parameters in the cash subsidy strategy and the free strategy in opposite directions.
作者 牟玉荣 仲伟俊 梅姝娥 张宇翔 Mu Yurong;Zhong Weijun;Mei Shu'e;Zhang Yuxiang(School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China;School of Network Security and Information Technology,Yili Normal University,Yining 835000,China)
出处 《Journal of Southeast University(English Edition)》 EI CAS 2024年第1期105-110,共6页 东南大学学报(英文版)
基金 The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.72371069,71871054).
关键词 内容平台 定价策略 选择 收费 免费 现金补贴 content platform pricing strategy choice charge free cash subsidy
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