摘要
基于董事会成员个人影响力和声誉差异所形成的隐形地位秩序,即非正式层级可能会影响甚至干扰董事会的职能行使,进而影响审计质量。以2009—2022年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,本文尝试探讨董事会非正式层级对审计质量的影响。研究发现:董事会非正式层级能促进审计质量提升,即董事会非正式层级越清晰,审计质量随之提升;机制检验表明,董事会非正式层级通过优化内部控制机制与缓解代理问题推动审计质量的提升。异质性分析中研究发现,相较于媒体关注,由政治关联和社会资本背景特征构成的董事会非正式层级对审计质量的提升作用更为显著。进一步研究发现认为,董事会非正式层级对审计质量提升效应源于董事会发挥积极的内在治理作用,并非通过选择高质量的审计机构来实现。文章研究结论为公司治理的持续优化和审计质量的提升提供了有力的理论依据和经验证据。
Invisible status order based on differences in individual influence and reputation of board members,i.e.,informal hierarchy,may affect or even interfere with the board’s supervisory ability,which in turn affects audit quality.Taking China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2022 as the research sample,this paper tries to explore the impact of board informal hierarchy on audit quality.It is found that:the informal level of the board of directors can promote audit quality,i.e.,the clearer the informal level of the board of directors is,the higher the audit quality will be;the mechanism test shows that the informal level of the board of directors promotes the audit quality by optimizing the internal control mechanism and alleviating the agency problem.In the heterogeneity analysis,it is found that the informal board hierarchy,which is characterized by political affiliation and social capital,has a more significant effect on audit quality than media attention.Further findings suggest that the audit quality enhancement effect of the informal level of the board of directors stems from the active and intrinsic governance role played by the board of directors and is not realized through the selection of high-quality audit firms.The findings of the article provide a strong theoretical basis and empirical evidence for the continuous optimization of corporate governance and the enhancement of audit quality.
作者
凌华
汪皓宇
LING Hua;WANG Hao-yu
出处
《科学决策》
CSSCI
2024年第11期96-118,共23页
Scientific Decision Making
基金
国家社科基金项目(20BGL221)
江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX24_2355)。
