摘要
数治时代下,企业为了给用户提供更好的体验往往会获取用户的信息,但是企业在利用这些信息的同时,也会出现泄露用户信息的问题。因此,构建了涵盖企业、员工和政府在内的三方演化博弈模型,探究了企业用户信息泄露的治理机制,并通过Matlab进行仿真分析。结果表明:①企业自律初始意愿、员工积极工作初始意愿以及政府严格监管初始意愿显著正向影响三者后续行为策略的演化方向和收敛速度;②降低企业加强个人信息安全管理的成本会促使其选择加强自律策略;③增加信息泄露企业的处罚额,将会使监管机构选择严格监管策略,企业选择自律策略。
In the era of digital governance,enterprises habitually acquire user information with the aim of providing users with an enhanced experience.Nevertheless,when enterprises exploit this information,the problem of user information leakage arises concomitantly.Accordingly,a tripartite evolutionary game model was formulated among enterprises,employees and governments.The governance mechanism of enterprise user information leakage was explored and Matlab was used for simulation analysis.The results demonstrate that:①The initial propensity for self-discipline of enterprises,the initial inclination of employees to work actively and the initial inclination of strict supervision by the government exert a significantly positive influence on the evolution direction and convergence rate of the subsequent behavioral strategies of the three parties;②Reducing the cost of strengthening personal information security management will incentivize enterprises to opt for strategies of reinforcing self-discipline;③Increasing the penalty for enterprises information leakage will empower regulators to choose strict supervision strategies and induce enterprises to select self-discipline strategies.
作者
智路平
王斯忭
赵敬华
ZHI Lu-ping;WANG Si-bian;ZHAO Jing-hua(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2024年第9期70-80,共11页
Logistics Engineering and Management
关键词
信息安全
隐私保护
初始意愿
演化博弈
政府监管
information security
privacy protection
initial intention
evolutionary game
government supervision
