摘要
有限合伙制风险投资公司已成为美国风险投资的主流组织形式。在这种模式下存在着两个层次的委托代理关系:一是投资者与风险资本家之间的委托代理关系;二是风险资本家与风险企业家之间的委托代理关系。本文在委托代理模型的基础上分析了风险资本家的监控和声誉效应在解决不对称信息环境下的道德风险和激励问题的有效作用。这为我国风险投资业的发展提供了有意的启示。
Venture capital partnership has become a dominant organization form in the U.S venture capital industry. Under this investing pattern, there exit two types of principalagent relationship, ① the relationship between investor and venture capitalist, and ② the relationship between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. Based on the principalagent models, this paper indicates that the venture capitalist's monitoring and reputation effects play efficient roles in resolving the moral hazard incentive problem, providing some implications for China's venture capital industry.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2003年第2期59-61,72,共4页
Forecasting
基金
安徽省教育厅人文社科基金资助项目(2001JW087)
关键词
风险投资
委托代理
道德风险
声誉效应
venture capital
principal-agent
moral hazard
reputation effect
