摘要
本文以中国农地产权制度外收益产生的原因分析为基础 ,说明了国家一系列农地产权制度外收益内部化政策效果不佳的主要原因之一是由于农地产权各利益集团博弈的结果 ,并对我国农地产权利益集团进行了初步划分 ,探讨了各利益集团形成的过程及其利益目标 。
The division and formation of Chinese rural-land property benefit-blocs is mainly because of the Chinese special rural-land property-system history. At present, the Chinese rural-land property benefit-blocs can be divided three parts: the rural-land private property's asker benefit-bloc; the rural grass-root manager benefit-bloc; the statesman & bureaucrat benefit-bloc. Every benefit-bloc has its common benefit-target and similar valuation game-action. This benefit-bloc division is harmful to the target of rural-land property-deployment, and has some defaults. Some methods have been proposed in the last
出处
《农业经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第2期22-25,共4页
Issues in Agricultural Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目 ( 70 2 73 0 12 )和 ( 70 3 73 0 5 4)
湖北省教育厅重点资助项目 ( 2 0 0 1A45 0 0 6)部分成果
