摘要
运用博弈论中的"委托-代理理论"对工程监理制度下的业主与工程师之间的委托代理关系进行了分析。根据不同的假设条件构造了两类业主与工程师之间的委托-代理博弈模型,在此基础上分析了两博弈方(业主和工程师)的选择和行为。通过设计合理的监理合同(激励合同),利用内外部约束机制和市场声誉能有效抑制在不对称信息环境下的道德风险,为我国监理制度的健康发展提供了有益的启示。
The principal-agent relationship between employer and engineer is analyzed by applying 'principal-agent theory' in the game theory. Two types of principal-agent model are established according to different hypothesis, and the players' action and choices are analyzed. The incentive contract between employer and engineer, interior and exterior constraint mechanism as well as reputation effects play sufficient roles in reducing the moral hazard, which provide implications for healthy development of Chinese engineering supervision institution.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第4期142-146,共5页
China Soft Science
